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INTRODUCTION
Responsible social policy mandates that we deter those who
victimize society through egregious and dangerous acts. Histor-
ically, the criminal law has been the vehicle for such deter-
rence. Corporations are increasingly significant actors in our
economy' and, to the extent their actions can victimize society,
they too should be deterred. For this reason, criminal prosecu-
tion of corporations has routinely occurred in American courts
for almost a century.2 Commentators, however, have consist-
ently questioned this use of the criminal law.3 Moreover, the
1. For sources discussing the impact of corporations, see M.B. CIjNARD,
CORPORATE CORRUPTION 1-6 (1990); E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTRoL, CORPO-
RATE PowER 1-5 (1981); Introduction: Corporate America, in CORPORATIONS
AND SociErry, POWER AND RESPONSmLITY 1-8 (W. Samuels & A. Miller eds.
1987). L. a MOKHIBER, CORPORATE CRIME AND VIOLENCE 14-20 (1988) (focus-
ing on the costs of corporate crime).
2. 1 K. BRiCKEY, CoRPoRATE CRIMINAL LIABLITY § 2.09 (1984).
Brickey's three-volume treatise is an excellent work on all aspects of corpo-
rate criminal liability as well as on many aspects of white collar crime in gen-
eral. For other sources discussing the historical evolution of corporate
criminal liability, see Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief
History and an Observation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 393, 401-04, 405-21 (1982); Elkins,
Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 KY. L.J. 73, 85-96
(1976); Lederman, Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporatio: Rethinking a
Complex Triangle, 76 J. CRim. L. & CRMNwOLOGY 285, 288-93 (1985).
3. In addition to the sources in note 1, supra, scholarship on this debate
includes H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 361-362 (1968);
Canfield, Corporate Responsibility for Crime, 14 COLUM. L. REv. 469, 472-81
(1914); Fisse, Restructuring Corporate Criminal Law, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1141
(1983); Francis, Criminal Responsibility of the Corporation, 18 ILL L. REV. 305
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debate over corporate criminal liability will likely intensify as
the government increasingly prosecutes prominent corporate
defendants. 4 Two major issues have dominated this debate.
One is the failure to identify or prove corporate intent. Tradi-
tionally, the criminal law has been reserved for intentional vio-
lations of the law.5 Yet, our prosecutions of corporations have
been marked by floundering efforts to identify the intent of in-
tangible, fictional entities. 6 A second issue in the debate con-
cerns sanctions.7 In addition to proof of intent, a major
distinguishing characteristic of the criminal law has been the
threat of imprisonment.s Critics of corporate criminal liability
(1924); Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in En-
forcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 423 (1963); Mueller, Mens
Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. Prrr. L. REv. 21 (1957); Orland, Reflections on
Corporate Crime: Law in Search of Theory and Scholarship, 17 AM. CRiM. L.
REV. 501 (1980); Developments in the Law - Corporate Crime: Regulating
Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1227, 1365-
75 (1979) [hereinafter Developments].
4. See, e.g., United States v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Criminal Case
No. 89-41 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 24, 1989); Cushman, Exon is Indicted by U.S.
Grand Jury in Spill at Valdez, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
5. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 187 (1968) ("In all ad-
vanced legal systems liability to conviction for serious crimes is made depen-
dent, not only on the offender having done those outward acts which the law
forbids but on his having done them in a certain frame of mind or with a cer-
tain will .... "); see also J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 11-
13 (1947); Lee, Corporate Criminal Liability, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1-3 (1928)
(arguing that imputing vicarious liability to corporations for their agents' acts
violates traditional mens rea requirement). Considerable efforts have been de-
voted to defining "intent" or "mens rea." See 1 J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW
§§ 368-73 (1865); H.L.A. HART, supra, at 136-57. For purposes of this Article,
mens rea is used to signify "the mental element necessary to convict for any
crime." Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REv. 974, 974 n.1 (1932).
6. For scholars addressing this issue, see, e.g., Fisse, supra note 3, at 1183
("Is it possible to attribute fault to a corporation on a genuinely corporate yet
workable basis? This question has proven to be the blackest hole in the theory
of corporate criminal law."); Mueller, supra note 3, at 38; Developments, supra
note 3, at 1241 (mens rea "has no meaning when applied to a corporate defend-
ant since an organization possesses no mental state"). Mueller refers to the
substantive difficulties that must be overcome in devising a standard of corpo-
rate criminal liability. He states that one such difficulty is whether the corpo-
ration can "engage in conduct at all" but that the "more difficult question" is
"whether it can entertain mens rea." Id,
7. Commentators who address the sanctioning issue include Coffee, 'No
Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem
of Corporate Punishment, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 386 (1981); Lederman, supra note
2, at 309-24; McAdams, The Appropriate Sanctions for Corporate Criminal Li-
ability: An Eclectic Alternative, 46 U. CINN. L. REV. 989 (1977); Posner, Opti-
mal Sentences for White Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 409 (1980).
8. J. HALL, supra note 5, at 191 ("At least since Plato, compensation has
been distinguished from punishment.").
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suggest that because a corporation cannot be imprisoned, the
criminal law is not an appropriate vehicle for controlling corpo-
rate behavior. Much of the recent scholarship on corporate
crime has addressed the sanctioning issue.9 This Article, how-
ever, addresses corporate intent and suggests that a better reso-
lution of this issue would eliminate much of the controversy
concerning corporate criminal liability, including the contro-
versy over sanctions.
Scholars have long decried the inability of our current
standards of corporate criminal liability to address corporate in-
tent. According to Gerhard O.W. Mueller, "[m]any weeds have
grown on the acre of jurisprudence which has been allotted to
the criminal law. Among these.., is corporate criminal liabil-
ity .... Nobody bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody planted it.
It just grew."10 John Braithwaite is more succinct: "A crimi-
nology which remains fixed at the level of individualism is the
criminology of a bygone era."11 Brent Fisse calls the inability
to address corporate fault "the blackest hole in the theory of
9. One factor focusing our attention on the sanctioning issue has been
the United States Sentencing Commission's recent efforts to formulate guide-
lines for the sentencing of corporations in federal courts. This Commission
was created under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, as amended, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-3559 (1988), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988). It is an "independent com-
mission in the judicial branch" and is charged with the task of establishing de-
terminative sentencing guidelines for the federal judicial system and to
"review and revise" the guidelines. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994, quoted in Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 368-69 (1989). The guidelines are "binding on
the courts, although ... the judge [has] the discretion to depart from the
guideline applicable to a particular case if the judge finds an aggravating or
mitigating factor present that the Commission did not adequately consider
when formulating guidelines." 488 U.S. at 367. In October 1986, the Commis-
sion issued its preliminary report on guidelines for corporate offenders. K.
BRICKEY, supra note 2, § 1.07 (Supp. 1990). Public hearings were held regard-
ing these guidelines on October 11, 1988 and December 2, 1988. On November
3, 1989, after receiving input from the public, the Department of Justice, and a
working group of private defense attorneys appointed by the Commission's
chairman, the Commission proposed new guidelines that included two alterna-
tive methods for calculating the amount of fines. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n,
Proposed Federal Guidelines for Sentencing of Organizations, 46 Crim. L.
Rep. (BNA) 2001, 2001-02, 2007-14 (Nov. 15, 1989). On October 26, 1990, again
after soliciting public comment, the Commission issued a new set of proposed
guidelines for sentencing organizations. The Commission solicited public com-
ment on this proposal, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Sentencing Guidelines For
Organizational Defendants, 48 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2001 (Oct. 31, 1990), and
submitted its final proposal to Congress on May 1, 1991. These proposed guide-
lines become law in 120 days unless rejected by Congress. Id.
10. Mueller, supra note 3, at 21.
11. J. BRArrHWArrE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 148 (1989).
1098 [Vol. 75:1095
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corporate criminal law."' 2
This Article proposes a standard of corporate'crimina lia-
bility that uses a new conceptual paradigm for identifying and
proving corporate intent. This standard assumes that each cor-
porate entity has a distinct and identifiable personality or
"ethos." The government can convict a corporation under this
standard only if it proves that the corporate ethos encouraged
agents of the corporation to commit the criminal act. Central
to this approach is the assumption that organizations possess an
identity that is independent of specific individuals who control
or work for the organization. This corporate identity, or
"ethos," results from the dynamic of many individuals working
together toward corporate goals. The living cell provides an apt
analogy: Just as a living cell has an identity separate from the
activities of its constituent molecules, a corporation has an iden-
tity separate from its individual agents.
In a sense, this corporate ethos standard takes its cue from
notions of intent developed in the context of individual liability.
When considering whether an individual should be held crimi-
nally liable we ask, did this person commit this act accidentally
or purposely. If the individual committed the act purposely, we
consider it to be a crime, while if the individual committed the
act accidentally, we do not. Similarly, the standard proposed
herein imposes criminal liability on a corporation only if the
corporation encouraged the criminal conduct at issue. If it did,
the criminal conduct is not an accident or the unpredictable act
of a maverick employee. Instead, the criminal conduct is pre-
dictable and consistent with corporate goals, policies, and ethos.
In the context of a fictional entity, this translates into
intention.
This proposed standard offers the following four advan-
tages over the current standards of liability. To the extent that
historical and current standards of corporate criminal liability
allow criminal convictions without proof of the corporation's in-
tent, they encourage the blurring of criminal and civil liability.
This blurring dilutes the impact of a criminal conviction,'3 and,
12. Fisse, supra note 3, at 1183.
13. For example, scholars have long discussed the problems that arise
when the criminal sanction is used for what is essentially a regulatory matter,
or when an inappropriately severe criminal sanction is imposed. See, e.g., J.
BRArrHwArTE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE, ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFTY
(1985). Braithwaite discusses the enforcement practice of the Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA) and its increasingly punitive approach. I&L at
3. He suggests that "nitpicking punitive enforcement of specific rules can even
199,1] 1099
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ultimately, erodes the power of the criminal law. The theoreti-
cal and practical framework of the corporate ethos standard
provides a method for identifying and proving the intent of cor-
porate actors. This is its first and major advantage.
The second advantage of the corporate ethos standard is
that it distinguishes among diverse corporations. The current
standards of corporate criminal liability often treat all corpora-
tions alike by imposing criminal liability on corporations for
the acts of their individual agents, regardless of the circum-
stances within a particular corporation. From Bentham on,
scholars and practitioners have recognized that a fundamental
requirement for any criminal justice system is that the system
treat like actors alike and different actors differently. 14 Any-
one, from the average person on the street to the most
respected scholar in organizational behavior, recognizes that no
two corporations are alike. Our criminal justice system should
not treat them as if they were.
The third advantage of the corporate ethos standard is that
it rewards those corporations that make efforts to educate and
motivate their employees to follow the letter and spirit of the
law. This encourages responsible corporate behavior. This ad-
vantage is in sharp contrast to the Model Penal Code's standard
of liability that discourages higher echelon employees from
properly supervising lower echelon employees.15 This advan-
corrupt the integrity of a total safety plan for a mine." id. at 102. For fuller
discussion of how this could occur, see id. at 102-12. Braithwaite concludes:
"The trick of successful regulation... becomes that of imposing punishment
when needed, without undermining the capacity of the [MSHA] inspectors to
persuade." Id. at 117; see also J. BENTHAM, Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation, in 1 J. BOWRING, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 95
(ch. 17, para. 23) (1843) (arguing that unneeded punishment should be avoided
to prevent people from perceiving the law as unfair).
14. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAWS 155 (1961) (arguing that the
"leading precept" of justice "is often formulated as 'Treat like cases alike';
though we need to add... 'and treat different cases differently' "). As Muel-
ler stated, "It is a poor legal system indeed which is unable to differentiate be-
tween the law breaker and the innocent victim of circumstances so that it
must punish both alike." Mueller, supra note 3, at 45; see also L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAWS 39 (1969) (implicit in Fuller's eight principles of legality is
the premise that all like persons should be treated alike).
15. For criticisms of the Model Penal Code (IPC) standard of corporate
criminal liability as contained in § 2.07(1)(c), see P. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 182 (1984) ("[I]dentification cannot always be re-
stricted to high officials."); Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability Under the
Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 593, 626 (1988) ("In short, a liability rule
requiring proof that a high managerial agent ratified a subordinate's miscon-
duct is apt to be, in practice, a rule of no liability at all."); and Developments,
1100 [Vol. 75:1095
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tage also contrasts with the minimal deterrence achieved by im-
posing criminal liability on individuals within the corporation.
Convicting individual agents and employees of a corporation
does not stop other corporate employees from committing fu-
ture criminal acts if sufficient internal corporate pressure to vi-
olate the law continues to exist. In such an environment, the
agents are cogs in a wheel. Those convicted are simply replaced
by others whose original propensity to obey the law is similarly
overcome by a corporate ethos that encourages illegal acts. Un-
less inside or outside forces change the lawless ethos, it will
corrupt each generation of corporate agents. The proposed
standard of liability addresses this problem by punishing any
corporation that establishes a lawless ethos which overcomes its
employees' propensity to obey the law.
The last advantage of the corporate ethos standard is that
it is practical, workable, and provable, from concrete informa-
tion already available in grand jury investigations of corporate
crime. To ascertain the ethos of a corporation, and to deter-
mine if this ethos encouraged the criminal conduct at issue, the
factfinder should examine: the corporate hierarchy, the corpo-
rate goals and policies, the corporation's historical treatment of
prior offenses, the corporation's efforts to educate and monitor
employees' compliance with the law, and the corporation's com-
pensation scheme, especially its policy on indemnification of
corporate employees. These facts are typically, or easily, ex-
amined in any criminal investigation of corporate misdeeds and
are subject to proof in a courtroom.
Part I of this Article provides background. It sets forth the
current standards of corporate criminal liability and describes
their approach to intent. Part I then explains why proof of in-
tent is essential to a criminal justice system, and provides an
historical discussion of how American criminal law developed
corporate criminal liability without this traditional emphasis on
intent. Part II sets forth the corporate ethos standard, listing
each of its elements and discussing how to prove each element.
After examining the results in different types of cases when us-
ing the corporate ethos standard versus the current standards
of corporate criminal liability, Part II compares the corporate
supra note 3, at 1254 (corporate criminal liability can be evaded "as long as
high officials remain ignorant of illegal activity"). Also, the MdPC system "has
an additional drawback in that large corporations can more easily evade liabil-
ity than small ones" because the large corporations have more layers of man-
agers who can remain shielded from information. Id.
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ethos standard to other proposals for enhancing corporate re-
sponsibility. Part III addresses the procedural implications of
adopting a standard such as corporate ethos, while Part IV an-
swers potential criticisms of the corporate ethos standard.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE CURRENT STANDARDS OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
American jurisprudence has employed two major standards
to determine when a corporation should be criminally liable.
Both impose vicarious liability16 by imputing the criminal acts
and intent of corporate agents to the corporation. The tradi-
tional or respondeat superior approach is a common law rule
developed primarily in the federal courts and adopted by some
state courtsY7 Derived from agency principles in tort law,'" it
provides that a corporation "may be held criminally liable for
the acts of any of its agents [who] (1) commit a crime (2) within
the scope of employment (3) with the intent to benefit the cor-
poration."'19 As construed by most courts, the latter two re-
quirements are almost meaningless. 20 Courts deem criminal
conduct to be "within the scope of employment" even if the
conduct was specifically forbidden by a corporate policy and the
corporation made good faith efforts to prevent the crime.21
Similarly, courts deem criminal conduct by an agent to be
16. Vicarious liability occurs when B is held liable for the actions of A
"although B has played no part in [the actions], has done nothing whatever to
aid or encourage it, or indeed has done all that he possibly can to prevent it."
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 499 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. Vicarious liabil-
ity is sometimes called imputed mens rea and "is given the Latin name of re-
spondeat superior." Id.
17. Note, Corporate Criminal Liability for Acts In Violation of Company
Policy, 50 GEO. L.J. 547, 547-51 (1962). States that have adopted the traditional
respondeat superior standard of liability include Alaska (ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.16.130 (1989)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 16-2-22 (1988)); New Jersey (N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-7 (West 1982)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-3 (Burns
1985)); and Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3206 (1988)).
18. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481,
493-94 (1909); Elkins, supra note 2, at 97.
19. Developments, supra note 3, at 1247; see also Note, supra note 17, at
547-48 (arguing that the courts have gone beyond vicarious liability in holding
corporations criminally liable for actions by their employees which they have
general policies prohibiting those acts).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 245-53.
21. K. BRicKEY, supra note 2, § 3.02; Developments, supra note 3, at 1149-
1102 [Vol. 75:1095
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"with the intent to benefit the corporation" even when the cor-
poration received no actual benefit from the offense and no one
within the corporation knew of the criminal conduct at the
time it occurred.22 With these latter two requirements thus
weakened, a corporation may be criminally liable whenever one
of its agents (even an independent contractor in some circum-
stances) commits a crime related in almost any way to the
agent's employment.23
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code (MPC)
provides the major alternative standard for corporate criminal
liability currently found in American jurisprudence. In the
1950s, the American Law Institute addressed the issue of corpo-
rate criminal liability, ultimately agreeing on three standards
for such liability.24 The type of criminal offense charged deter-
mines which standard applies. The option that applies to the
majority of criminal offenses25 provides that a court may hold a
corporation criminally liable if the criminal conduct was "au-
thorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly toler-
ated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent
acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office
or employment. '26 This standard still uses a respondeat supe-
rior model, but in a limited fashion: the corporation will be lia-
ble for conduct of only some agents (its directors, officers; or
other higher echelon employees).
The critical weakness in both the traditional respondeat su-
perior and MPC standards of liability is that they fail to suffi-
ciently analyze corporate intent. Cases where a corporate
employee acted contrary to express corporate policy and yet the
court still held the corporation liable best exemplify this weak-
22. K. BRICKEY, supra note 2, § 4.02; Developments, supra note 3, at 1250.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 245-53.
24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
25. The MPC includes two additional standards of corporate liability. Sec-
tion 2.07(1)(a) applies to minor infractions and non-Code penal offenses "in
which a legislative purpose to impose liability on corporations plainly ap-
pears." Id. § 2.07(1)(a). The standard in § 2.07(1)(a) is broad respondeat supe-
rior, for the corporation is held liable whenever "the conduct is performed by
an agent of the corporation acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope
of his office or employment." Id. Section 2.07(1)(b) applies to omissions and
provides strict liability for the corporation that fails to "discharge a specific
duty" imposed by law. IH § 2.07(l)(b).
For an excellent discussion of the tension created by these multiple stan-
dards of liability, especially between § 2.07(1)(a) and § 2.07(1)(c), see Brickey,
supra note 15, at 604-11.
26. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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ness. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp. provides an apt ex-
ample. The purchasing agent at a Hilton Hotel in Portland,
Oregon, threatened a supplier of goods with the loss of the ho-
tel's business if the supplier did not contribute to an association
that was formed to attract conventions to Portland.2s The cor-
porate president testified that such action was contrary to cor-
porate policy.- Both the manager and assistant manager of the
Portland Hilton Hotel also testified that they specifically told
the purchasing agent not to threaten suppliers.30 Nevertheless,
the court convicted the Hilton Hotel Corporation of antitrust
violations under the respondeat superior standard of liability.31
Because the respondeat superior standard focuses solely on
an individual corporate agent's intent and automatically im-
putes that intent to the corporation, a corporation's efforts to
prevent such conduct are irrelevant. Under this approach all
corporations, honest or dishonest, good or bad, are convicted if
the government can prove that even one maverick employee
committed criminal conduct.
The MPC's requirement that a higher echelon employee
commit, or recklessly supervise, the criminal conduct is an im-
provement over the traditional respondeat superior approach.
Recognizing the unfairness of holding a corporation liable for
the acts of all its agents, the MPC views the corporation as the
embodiment of the acts and intent of only its "high managerial
agent[s]. ''32 High managerial agents are those individuals "hav-
ing duties of such responsibility that [their] conduct may fairly
be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation or
association. '33
The MPC's refinement of traditional respondeat superior
suffers from three serious problems, however. The first prob-
lem, the maverick employee, still arises because the MPC uses
the same conceptual paradigm as does respondeat superior -
27. 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
28. Id. at 1002.
29. Id. at 1004.
30. Id,
31. Id. The court noted that "Congress may constitutionally impose crimi-
nal liability upon a business entity for acts or omissions of its agents within the
scope of their employment." Id-
32. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (Proposed Offical Draft 1962).
33. "'[H]igh managerial agent' means an officer of a corporation or an un-
incorporated association, or, in the case of a partnership, a partner, or any
other agent of a corporation or association having duties of such responsibility
that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corpora-
tion or association." Id. § 2.07(4)(c).
1104 [Vol. 75:1095
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that is, the MPC automatically imputes the intent of individual
corporate agents (albeit only the higher echelon agents) to the
corporation. According to the MPC standard, a corporation
whose higher echelon official performed or supervised illegal
conduct is criminally liable even if the higher echelon official
was a maverick acting contrary to express corporate policy. For
example, in Hilton Hotels, if the factfinder found that the
purchasing agent had "duties of such responsibility that his
conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the
corporation or association," the agent would be a "high mana-
gerial agent," and the Hilton Hotels Corporation would be
criminally liable. By automatically imputing the intent of an
individual within the corporation to the corporation, the MPC
standard, like the traditional respondeat superior standard, pro-
vides for inappropriately broad liability.
The second problem with the MPC standard is that even if
a clear corporate policy caused a lower echelon employee to
commit an offense, the corporation is liable only if there is evi-
dence that a specific higher echelon official recklessly tolerated
this conduct. Injustice also results from this problem but here
the liability is too narrow: a corporation is not held criminally
liable when it should be.
The third problem with the MPC standard is commonly,
and deservedly, identified. The MPC standard encourages
higher echelon officials to insulate themselves from knowledge
of corporate employee activity. Under this standard, if higher
echelon officials can maintain unawareness of illegal conduct
by corporate employees, it is difficult to prove that they toler-
ated such conduct, and therefore nearly impossible to hold the
corporation criminally liable. By encouraging such unaware-
ness, the MPC discourages corporations from policing them-
selves.35 Thus, although the MPC is somewhat successful in
refining the traditional respondeat superior standard, it still
provides an inadequate approach to assessing corporate intent.
B. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL ROLE OF INTENT
The notion of intent has changed over time, primarily as
the objectives of our criminal justice systems have changed.36
34. Id-
35. See supra note 15 for other commentators who have discussed this
weakness in the MPC.
36. Sayre, supra note 5, at 1016. For a critical analysis of Sayre's ap-
proach, see J. HALL, supra note 5, at 138-68. Despite his criticisms of Sayre's
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Prior to the twelfth century, there apparently was no notion of
criminal intent. Rather, liability was absolute. The law, how-
ever, rarely distinguished between tort and crime. The law
simply attempted to induce the victim of a wrong (or his rela-
tives) "to accept money payments in place of taking violent re-
venge. '37 Because of a rebirth of interest in Roman law38 and
the influence of canon law,3 9 by the twelfth to thirteenth centu-
ries punishment of evil-doing had become the objective of crim-
inal justice. The notion of mens rea thus developed as a way of
distinguishing those who should be criminally liable from those
who should not.40 Under this view, for example, parents who
allowed a child to die because their religious views reject
medicine were not guilty of a crime because, regardless of the
danger to the child, the parents intended no evil.4 1 During the
thirteenth through seventeenth centuries, the notion of intent
continued to evolve from "its old connotation of moral guilt" to
a more precise notion of intent at a given time.42 Technical def-
initions of mens rea developed for separate crimes.4 3 Today,
approach, Hall agrees with the basic point that our notion of mens rea has
evolved, and will continue to evolve, over time. 'There is no reason to believe
that our understanding of mens rea is complete, and none to think that the
meaning of the term will not continue to change." Id at 165.
37. Sayre, supra note 5, at 976-77. Sayre cautions us in concluding that
simply because the old records fail to show mens rea as an essential element
for a finding of criminality, mens rea was entirely disregarded during this
time. He notes 'that by definition, some crimes were impossible to commit
without such a finding (e.g., robbery, arson). In addition, the defendant's in-
tent "seems to have been a material factor, even from the very earliest times,
in determining the extent of punishment." Id at 981.
38. During this renewed interest in Roman law, thirteenth century schol-
ars such as Bracton took up the Roman notions of "dolus" and "culpa" with
interest. The study of these concepts "required careful consideration of the
mental element in crime." Id at 983; see 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 267-86 (3d ed. 1923); Bodenstein, Phases in the Development of
Criminal Mens Rea, 36 S. AFR. L.J. 323, 327-33 (1919).
39. Penitential books "made the measure of penance for various sins very
largely dependent upon the state of mind." Sayre, supra note 5, at 983. Sayre
provides several examples: "Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her
hath committed adultery with her already in his heart." Id "If a cleric has
planned in his heart to smite or kill his neighbor, he shall do penance half a
year on bread and water according to the prescribed amount, and for a whole
year abstain from wine and the eating of meat and then may he be permitted
to approach the alter." Id at 983 n.29 (citing Vinnian in J. AYER, SOURCE
BOOK FOR ANCIENT CHURCH HISTORY 626-27 (1930)).
40. Sayre, supra note 5, at 989-90, 993, 1017.
41. Id at 1018 (citing Regina v. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox C. C. 530, 534 (1868);
Regina v. Hines, 13 Cox C. C. 111, 114-15 (1875)).
42. Sayre, supra note 5, at 1000.
43. Id at 994-1004, 1019-20. For example, "malice aforethought" distin-
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the objectives of our modern criminal justice system focus less
on "awarding adequate punishment for moral wrongdoing"
than on "protecting social and public interests."44 Consistent
with this emphasis, our current notion of intent focuses less on
technical gradations of evil than on the harm to society. Ac-
cordingly, under our modern view, parents who fail to seek nec-
essary medical care for their child are guilty of manslaughter
because their actions threaten society's interest in the child's
health.45
With the rising prominence of corporate actors, our con-
cept of intent must continue to evolve. Common to our past
and present notions of intent is a focus on the individual ac-
tor.46 Our attempts to apply this notion of individual intent to
corporate actors, however, has failed. To date, our approach
has been to impute an individual actor's criminal intent to the
corporate actor. This Article suggests that this approach is not
only inadequate, but also harmful because it erodes the power
of the criminal law.
For hundreds of years, jurisprudential scholars have ad-
dressed the important functions that the intent requirement
serves in a criminal justice system. One such function is
greater social stability - requiring proof of intent enhances so-
cial stability by promoting voluntary compliance with the law.47
If laws are to succeed in promoting social stability, the vast ma-
jority of citizens must comply with them.48 Resources are not
guished between murder, punishable by death, and other homicides, "practi-
cally punishable ... by a year's imprisonment and branding on the brawn of
the thumb." Id- at 996-97. If a person broke into another's house "feloni-
ously," she committed burglary, but if she simply broke into another's house
(i.e., not feloniously), she committed trespass. Id. at 1001.
44. I. at 1017.
45. I& at 1018 (citing Commonwealth v. Breth, 44 Pa. C. 56 (1915); Rex v.
Brooks, 9 B.C.R. 13 (1902)).
46. As Fisse noted: "Modern corporate criminal law owes its origin and
design more to crude borrowings from individual criminal and civil law than
to any coherent assessment of the objectives of corporate criminal law and of
how those objectives might be attained." Fisse, supra note 3, at 1143. See also
id at n.1 for a listing of other literature "recognizing the unsystematic histori-
cal development of corporate criminal law."
47. H.L.A. HART, supra note 5, at 50 ("[P]eople obey the law... because it
offers a guarantee that the antisocial minority who would not otherwise obey
will be coerced into obedience by fear.").
48. According to H.L.A. Hart, "two minimum conditions" are "necessary
and sufficient for the existence of a legal system.... On the one hand those
rules of behaviour which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria
of validity must be generally obeyed, and on the other hand, its rules of recog-
nition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adju-
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available, nor should they be, to fuel the large law enforcement
machine that universal lawlessness would require. Voluntary
compliance will wane, however, if people view laws as unjust,
unfair, or arbitrary. People will perceive the criminal law as
unjust, unfair, and arbitrary if the law punishes A for acts that
occur despite A's every attempt to avoid those acts (strict liabil-
ity),49 or if it punishes A for what B did even when A had no
knowledge of B's behavior (vicarious liability).50 The intent re-
quirement avoids both of these possibilities by narrowing liabil-
ity to voluntary acts committed by a defendant.51
Realistically, a few exceptions of strict or vicarious liability
will not so greatly pollute the public's perception of the crimi-
nal justice system that voluntary compliance is substantially
curtailed. Extending these exceptions to most situations, how-
ever, creates this risk. Because vicarious liability is currently
the universal rule of liability for the group of people most di-
rectly affected by corporate criminal liability, namely, corpo-
rate executives, this group may view the criminal justice system
as unreasonable and unfair, and choose to disregard it.
Requiring proof of intent before imposing criminal liability
also serves a second function: it enhances consistent enforce-
ment of the law. Under the broad respondeat superior stan-
dards of liability, the government can prosecute corporations
for the illegal conduct of any agent acting within the scope of
his duties and with the intent to benefit the corporation. Such
broad potential liability offers little guidance to prosecutors.
Because resources are not available to prosecute every offend-
dication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official
behaviour by its officials." H.L.A. HART, supra note 14, at 113.
49. "Strict liability... means liability that is imposed on an actor apart
from either... an intent... or... a breach of duty.... This is often referred
to as liability without fault." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 16, § 75, at 534.
50. G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 647 (1978) ('"That liability is
'vicarious' simply expresses the conclusion that the defendant will be held lia-
ble for the acts of another.")
51. H.L.A. Hart discusses this point when he distinguishes the characteris-
tics that separate legal rules from moral rules. Hart notes that a person who
involuntarily abridged a moral rule is exempted from moral responsibility
(saying "to blame him in these circumstances would itself be considered mor-
ally objectionable"). H.L.A. HART, supra note 14, at 173. By contrast, Hart
notes that with objective standards of mens rea and notions like strict liability,
it is possible for an individual to violate a legal rule involuntarily and still be
held legally responsible. Although he notes this distinction, Hart cautions that
"[ifn any developed legal system," the mens rea requirement must be an "ele-
ment in criminal responsibility" for "[a] legal system would be open to serious
moral condemnation if this were not so ...." Id. at 173-74.
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ing corporation that meets this test, prosecutors must pick and
choose which corporations to prosecute.5 2 Even assuming all
prosecutors attempt to make this decision responsibly, individ-
ual prosecutors are left to implement their personal, and there-
fore variable, views on when to indict a corporation.53 Forcing
prosecutors to select cases based on corporate criminal intent,
however, would reign in this broad discretion and thus curtail
the potential for abuse and arbitrariness.
By focusing corporate criminal prosecutions on corpora-
tions with criminal intent, the intent requirement also maxi-
mizes wise use of scarce prosecutive resources. The following
hypothetical helps demonstrate this advantage. Assume two in-
dividuals commit bank larceny.M A is a mentally disoriented
individual who did not intend to steal from the bank, but was
delusional and believed that he was a wealthy person whose
home was the bank. Assume also that once A's medication is
properly equilibrated, A is competent to stand trial.a B, on the
52. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J.
Com. L. 532, 533-34 (1970); Orland, Reflections on Corporate Crime, supra
note 3, at 511 ("Thousands of corporate crime statutes are enacted by Congress
but relatively few are actively enforced by federal prosecutors."); Vorenburg,
Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1521, 1525, 1548-49
(1981) (noting at 1525 that "prosecutors increasingly have been forced to allo-
cate resources by deciding whether to charge and whether to offer leniency in
exchange for guilty pleas"); see also Rakoff, The F_.xercise of Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion in Federal Business Fraud Prosecutions, in CORRIGIBLE CoRPoRATIoNs
AND UNRULY LAw 173-86 (1985) (detailing the numerous vague policies and
guidelines prosecutors follow in deciding whether to press charges).
53. Although constitutional and ethical restrictions as well as Department
of Justice guidelines and customs limit the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
see Rakoff, supra note 52, at 171, the exercise of such discretion remains the
exercise of "one's own considered judgment and conscience." Id; see also Vor-
enberg, supra note 52, at 1521 (arguing that current restraints on prosecutorial
discretion are insufficient).
54. Bank larceny is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) as:
Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any
property or money or any other thing of value exceeding $100 belong-
ing to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of
any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, shall be
fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both ....
18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1988).
55. A court may judge a defendant's competency to stand trial prior to or
during trial. 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (1988). The statute directs the court to make a
finding of incompetence if it determines by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant is suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him
unable to "understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against
him or to assist properly in his defense .... " Id If so found the statute di-
rects the Attorney General to hospitalize the defendant until he is improved.
Id-.
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other hand, impulsively took a stack of $20 bills when a teller
stepped aside to answer a telephone. Reasonable jurors could
easily find that because A believed the bank's money belonged
to him, he did not have criminal intent. These jurors may well
acquit A on grounds of insanity.1 Reasonable jurors could also
find that B could control her behavior when she believes that
doing so is in her best interests and thus that she possessed
criminal intent when she stole the money. These jurors would
likely convict B.
Most district attorneys would not prosecute A, even if he is
competent to stand trial. He may be acquitted but even if he is
not, most prosecutors would recognize that professional therapy
probably offers a better chance for helping him, and for pro-
tecting society from A, than does criminal prosecution. More-
over, prosecuting A provides relatively little deterrent value,
even if prosecution were successful. Because of his mental defi-
ciencies, A did not intend to steal money, and prosecution will
not deter him from doing so again. Prosecution, however, may
deter B from committing this crime again (if not all crimes) for
now B can better assess the cost of unlawful conduct. Prosecu-
tion of B also may deter others who know of B's punishment
from committing larceny or other crimes.
The above scenario demonstrates Bentham's classic utilita-
rian argument in favor of the intent requirement: If the law is
to deter violations in an efficient manner, only voluntary viola-
tions of the law should be punished.57 H.L.A. Hart has criti-
cized this rationale for intent,58 and one cannot persuasively
offer it without addressing Hart's criticism. Hart argues that
allowing persons with "excusing" conditions, such as mental ill-
56. For purposes of prosecution in the American federal system, a defend-
ant is insane if he proves by clear and convincing evidence that "as a result of
severe mental disease or defect, [he] was unable to appreciate the nature and
quality or wrongfulness of his acts." 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1988). Because the rele-
vant inquiry and burden of proof differs for competency to stand trial and in-
sanity as a defense, an individual may be competent to stand trial but insane.
See supra note 55.
57. J. BENTHAM, supra note 13, at 84-85 (ch. 15, paras. 3-9). Bentham
stated:
It is plain, therefore, that in the following cases, punishment ought
not to be inflicted.... Where the penal provision, though it were con-
veyed to a man's notice, could produce no effect, with respect to the
preventing him from engaging in any act of the sort in question. Such
is the case.... [i]n extreme infancy... [i]n insanity... [in intoxica-
tion ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
58. H.L.A. HART, supra note 5, at 42-44.
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ness, to escape liability does not increase the efficiency of the
laws as Bentham argued, but diminishes their efficiency for so-
ciety at large. According to Hart, when society does not hold
offenders liable because of an "excusing condition" that pre-
vents the formation of intent, others will think that they too
can escape liability on such grounds and will feign such ex-
cuses.5 9 Thus, concludes Hart, while excusing conditions re-
spect the right of an individual not to be held liable for
something he cannot help, allowance for such conditions under-
mines, rather than promotes, compliance with the laws by
many within the general population.60
Although Hart's criticism has some merit, it is primarily
tweaking the utilitarian nose by pointing out that this argu-
ment is inconsistent with a basic tenet of utilitarianism,
namely, that individuals should sacrifice their own good to fur-
ther the welfare of society.6 ' Hart correctly notes the inconsis-
tency that excusing conditions pose for the utilitarians: To the
extent that excusing conditions encourage false claims, al-
lowing them is inefficient from a societal point of view.
When Hart's criticism goes beyond exposing an inconsis-
tency in utilitarian thought and assaults the value of intent as a
guide for maximum efficient use of resources, however, he is
wrong. To an individual prosecutor, the intent requirement is
an excellent guide for focusing prosecutorial resources. The
above hypothetical, while extreme, demonstrates this benefit.
Prosecution will not deter A from committing bank theft in the
future because A does not appreciate the wrongfulness of his
action. B, on the other hand, suffers from no such disability.
Prosecution thus may deter B from future unlawful conduct.
The intent requirement focuses our attention on this distinction
and channels prosecutive resources toward those cases that bet-
ter serve deterrence.
The third function of an intent requirement is promotion
of more consistent sentences. To date, sentences given corpo-
59. I& at 43.
60. Id at 43-44.
61. J. BENTHAM, supr note 13, at 2 (ch. 1, para. 9). Bentham observed
that:
A man may be said to be a partizan of the principle of utility, when
the approbation or disapprobation he annexes to any action, or to any
measure, is determined, by and proportioned to the tendency which
he conceives it to have to augment or to diminish the happiness of the
community: or in other words, to its conformity or unconformity to
the laws or dictates of utility.
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rate defendants have been notoriously erratic.62 This inconsis-
tency is due, certainly in part, to the lack of sentencing
guidelines for organizational defendants.63 It is also due to the
broad liability that both the respondeat superior and MPC stan-
dards for imposing corporate criminal liability allow. Because
of this broad liability, the corporate defendants that stand
ready for sentencing range from those that made exemplary ef-
forts to comply with the law6 to those that openly defied the
law.65 This moral diversity, coupled with the broad discretion
given sentencing courts, has led to widely ranging sentences.6
Imposing a standard of liability that requires proof of intent
would help standardize the corporate defendants that appear
before the courts. This standardization, in turn, would promote
consistency in sentences and likely facilitate passage of sentenc-
ing guidelines.
The fourth important function of the intent requirement
derives from prosecutorial focus and sentencing consistency:
62. Indeed, traditionally, serious discrepancies were common for criminal
sentences in general. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 650-51 (1989).
The court in Mistretta noted that before the implementation of federal sen-
tencing guidelines "the [sentencing] court and the [parole] officer were in posi-
tions to exercise, and usually did exercise, very broad discretion." Id. at 650.
63. The United States Sentencing Commission began formulating sentenc-
ing guidelines for organizational defendants in 1984 and submitted proposed
guidelines on May 1, 1991. These guidelines become law in 120 days unless
Congress rejects them. See supra note 9.
64. See, e.g., Riss & Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 245, 250 (8th Cir. 1958);
United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342, 342-43 (3d Cir. 1948).
65. See, e.g., Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 721
(5th Cir. 1963).
66. General Electric addressed the moral diversity of convicted corporate
defendants in its preliminary comments to the United States Sentencing Com-
mission's Proposed Organizational Sanctions. G.E. suggested that the fact that
corporations are currently convicted without proof of corporate intent was rel-
evant to formation of sentencing guidelines:
This is not the forum to argue the merits, or lack thereof, of the doc-
trine of imputed guilt or the extremes to which it is sometimes
pushed. There are substantial reasons of policy and constitutional
principle why the standards for finding a corporate person guilty of a
crime should be narrowed substantially. This is the place, however, to
point out that the current contours of the doctrine of imputed corpo-
rate criminal liability may permit a finding of guilt in the absence of
real culpability of the sort the criminal law normally addresses. The
Commission should appreciate this fundamental distinction when de-
ciding the underpinnings for the corporate sanction guidelines.
P. Lacovara & V. Toensing, Preliminary Comments of General Electric on The
United States Sentencing Commission's Proposed Organizational Sanctions 6
(Sept. 11, 1989) (available at offices of Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, Washington,
D.C.).
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An intent requirement allows potential defendants to better
predict and plan their futures. Under the broad vicarious liabil-
ity standards of respondeat superior and the MPC, a corpora-
tion has no way of predicting whether an individual prosecutor
will seek criminal charges against it on any given day for any
given crime. Nor, given current sentencing disparities, is a cor-
poration able to assess the cost for a breach of the law by its
employees and agents. However, when a corporation knows
that liability depends on its own voluntary acts, and that a
meaningful sentence will be imposed for illegal acts, it can bet-
ter plan and predict its future fate67 by choosing whether to en-
gage in activities that limit - or expand - its exposure to
criminal liability. Thus, by directing prosecutorial resources
and promoting more consistent sentences, the intent require-
ment allows corporate executives to more accurately assess the
costs of engaging in lawful, or unlawful, behavior.
In summary, requiring proof of intent bestows at least four
advantages on a criminal justice system. First, it adds a sense
of fairness to the system by focusing the criminal law on those
who intended to break the law. Such fairness promotes volun-
tary compliance with the law and social stability. Second, im-
posing an intent requirement focuses criminal prosecution on
corporations with a criminal intent, and thus directs
prosecutorial discretion so as to maximize efficient use of lim-
ited law enforcement resources. Third, an intent requirement
would lead to more consistent sentencing of corporate defend-
ants. Such consistency likely would occur on an ad hoc basis
simply because the corporate defendants that appear for sen-
tencing will be more alike. More consistent sentences also
would occur on a formal basis because greater uniformity
among corporate defendants would facilitate sentencing guide-
lines. Fourth, the intent requirement allows actors to better
predict and plan their futures. This advantage has special sig-
nificance for the corporate actor that, in contrast to most indi-
vidual actors, engages in substantial planning of its future
conduct.
67. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 5, at 23. Hart notes that in a system
where individuals are punished for unintentional conduct, they "will be liable
to have their plans frustrated by punishments for what they do unintention-
ally, in ignorance, by accident or mistake. Such a system ... would diminish
the individual's power to identify beforehand particular periods during which
he will be free from [punishment]." IML; see also id. at 181-82 (asserting that a
system that punishes only voluntary acts permits individuals to determine
their own fate).
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C. How CORPORATE CRmINAL LiABILIY DEVELOPED
WITHoUT AN INTENT REQUIREMENT
If mens rea is essential to a fair and just criminal justice
system, how did criminal liability of corporations develop with-
out this element? The answer is amazingly simple: In devising
the parameters of corporate criminal liability, courts borrowed
the respondeat superior principle from tort law and applied it
to criminal law. The problem is that they did so without ad-
dressing the jurisprudential questions of whether, or how, this
principle has a place in criminal law. Analysis of the Supreme
Court's opinion in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad
v. United States68 sheds light on this development. Not only is
New York Central the premiere decision establishing criminal
liability for corporations in American law,69 but its flawed and
outdated reasoning exemplifies the analysis of corporate crimi-
nal liability by many subsequent courts. 70
The New York Central Railroad employed an assistant
traffic manager who gave "rebates" on railroad rates to certain
railroad users. As a result, the effective shipping rate for these
users was less than the mandated rates.71 New York Central
was held criminally liable under bribery statutes for the acts of
this assistant traffic manager.72 Noting that the principle of re-
spondeat superior was well established in civil tort law, the
Court stated that "every reason in public policy" justified
"go[ing] only a step farther" and applying respondeat superior
to criminal law.73 With this reasoning, the court established
the traditional respondeat superior standard of criminal liabil-
ity for corporations: A corporation is criminally liable for all
acts of its agents committed while the agent was exercising the
authority conferred upon him.74
The Court's reasoning in New York Central contains three
major flaws that other courts have exacerbated over time. First
68. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
69. Note, supra note 17, at 548.
70. For other analyses critical of the reasoning in New York Central, see
id, at 551-52, 556; Francis, supra note 3, at 313, 315, 320-23; Orland, supra note
3, at 502-04.
71. New York Cent., 212 U.S. at 489-90.
72. The trial court fined New York Central & Hudson River Railroad
$18,000 on each of six counts for a total fine of $108,000. The court fined the
assistant manager $1,000 on each of the six counts for which he was convicted,
resulting in a total fine of $6,000. Id. at 490.
73. I& at 493-95.
74. Id at 494.
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is the Court's failure to appreciate the inherently different na-
ture of civil and criminal law. Second is the Court's failure to
consider the civil alternatives to corporate criminal liability.
Third is the Court's failure to examine the alternative stan-
dards for imposing criminal liability upon corporations.
Tort lawsuits are designed primarily to compensate one
party for the damage caused by another party.7 5 The collection
of damages, not deterrence of future conduct, is the paramount
concern of any tort plaintiff.7 6 While the threat of tort liability
may well deter injurious conduct in some circumstances, such a
deterrent effect is not the plaintiff's goal. Deterrence is simply
a side-effect of the tort lawsuit. As compared to criminal liabil-
ity, tort liability often carries no moral or punitive stigma; it is
simply a cost of doing business. 77
Criminal lawsuits, on the other hand, are selected and
prosecuted precisely because of the impact a conviction will
have on future conduct by the general public.7 The fact that a
public servant, not the victim, brings the criminal action aptly
75. Hart refers to the criminal law as "conceived not only as restricting
liberty but as providing protection from various sorts of harm," and to civil
law as "conceived as offering redress for haim." H.L.A. HART, supra note 14,
at 157. Jerome Hall, in General Principles of Criminal Law, discussed the his-
torical efforts to distinguish torts from criminal law. J. HALL, supra note 5, at
188-214. Hall notes formal and "very important substantive" difficulties in
comparing the disciplines. I& at 191. After discussing these, he concludes by
suggesting that "the economic function of torts does not rest upon the same
ethical rationale that supports penal law." Id at 214.
For a fascinating discussion on how punitive damages interface civil tort
law and criminal law, see Symposium Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REv. 687
(1989).
76. Mueller, supra note 3, at 38.
77. As Jerome Hall stated: "Moral culpability is of secondary importance
in tort law - immoral conduct is simply one of the various ways by which in-
dividuals suffer economic damage. But in penal law.., the immorality of the
actor's conduct is essential - whereas pecuniary damage is entirely irrele-
vant." J. HALL, supra note 5, at 203.
78. This utilitarian theory of punishment is discussed in J. BENTHAM,
supra note 13, ch. 16; see also MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.07 commentary at 148
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1956) ("It would seem that the ultimate justification of cor-
porate criminal responsibility must rest in large measure on an evaluation of
the deterrent effects of corporate fines on the conduct of corporate agents.").
Some would disagree that deterrence should be the reason for criminal pun-
ishment, arguing that criminal punishment should not be imposed because of
its consequences on future behavior, but because an individual acted immor-
ally. Kant sets forth the classic argument for this position. I. KANT, THE MET-
APHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 99-107 (Bobbs-Merrill ed. 1965) (1st ed. 1791).
The positions are not incompatible. Some commentators suggest that both
goals should be served by criminal punishment. See, e.g., Hart, The Aims of
the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 401, 406-11 (1958).
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evidences this primary aim of the criminal law.79 Compensa-
tion of the defendant's victim is subsidiary to the deterrent
value of pursuing any given criminal case. Until recently, resti-
tution to the victims was not a recognized consideration even at
sentencing. Currently, the federal courts consider restitution in
imposing sentences upon convicted defendants, but it is entirely
within the court's discretion whether to award such compensa-
tion.80 Moreover, unlike a verdict for the plaintiff in a tort ac-
tion, a verdict for the plaintiff in a criminal action carries not
only a moral stigma for the defendant, but also a loss of funda-
mental civic rights.81
The notion of respondeat superior is thus well suited to
torts. It serves the compensation-to-the-victim goal well, for
generally it is more equitable for the employer of the tortfeasor
to absorb the financial loss caused by its agent's conduct than
for the individual victim to do so. 8 2 Respondeat superior, how-
ever, is anathema to the criminal law which, we have seen,
should focus on personal intent. Remarkably, the Supreme
Court in New York Central boldly reached into the civil law for
a model to apply to the criminal law, without addressing the
79. 1 J. AusTIN, Different Kinds of Sanctions, in LECTURES ON JURISPRU-
DENCE 517-18, 520 (R. Campbell 4th ed. 1873).
80. In 1982, Congress passed the Victim and Witness Protection Act,
§ 5(a), 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1) (1988), which provides: 'The court, when sen-
tencing a defendant [convicted of all title 18 offenses and certain title 49 of-
fenses] may order... that the defendant make restitution to any victim of the
offense."
81. As Henry M. Hart, Jr. stated, "What distinguishes a criminal from a
civil sanction and all that distinguishes it .... is the judgment of community
condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition." Hart, supra
note 78, at 404; see also, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 commentary at 148
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1956) (referring to the "opprobrium and incidental disabili-
ties which normally follow a personal conviction"); J. BENTHAM, THE LIMITS
OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 288 (Colum. Univ. ed. 1945) (referring to one cir-
cumstance distinguishing civil and criminal law as "the quantum of displea-
sure or disapprobation which is annexed, or thought to be annexed [to crimes]
by the community in general").
Civic rights may be lost when one is convicted of a crime. For example, 29
U.S.C. § 504(a) (1988) provides that persons convicted of certain offenses may
not serve in a variety of labor union positions. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1988)
makes it a crime, punishable by a sentence not to exceed ten years, id. at
§ 924(a)(2), for any person convicted of a felony to ship, transport, possess or
receive any firearm that has been shipped in interstate commerce. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7313 (1988) renders persons convicted of certain offenses ineligible to "accept
or hold any position in the Government of the United States or in the govern-
ment of the District of Columbia for the five years immediately following the
date upon which his conviction becomes final."
82. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 16, § 69.
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differences between these spheres. The only indication that the
Court recognized that the difference between civil and criminal
law may be relevant is when it asserted, with little analysis or
discussion,83 that "no good reason can be seen" for not applying
the civil concept of respondeat superior to criminal corporate li-
ability s4 Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's
lead. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, in affirming the conviction of a utilities corpora-
tion, stated that "[i]f the act was.., done [by a corporate em-
ployee] it will be imputed to the corporation .... There is no
longer any distinction in essence between the civil and criminal
liability of corporations, based upon the element of intent or
wrongful purpose."'' 5
The second flaw in the New York Central reasoning is its
failure to consider the civil options to criminal liability of cor-
porations. The Court stated that failure to impose criminal lia-
bility on corporations would "virtually take away the only
means of effectually controlling the subject matter and cor-
recting the abuses aimed at."' 86 This statement is, of course, in-
accurate. There are two major options to criminal liability of
corporations: criminal liability of the responsible individuals
within the corporation,8 7 and civil remedies against the corpora-
tion.88 If the Supreme Court's statement regarding the role of
criminal liability of corporations is accurate, both of these op-
tions must be ineffectual. This Article submits that civil reme-
dies against the corporation are effective, and although
individual criminal liability may be ineffective in some circum-
stances, its failing does not justify corporate criminal liability
on broad respondeat superior principles.
Arguably, we should forgive the Supreme Court for dis-
missing civil liability of corporations as an "ineffectual" re-
sponse to violations of the law. When the Supreme Court
decided New York Central, administrative regulation and super-
vision was in its infancy. Since 1909, however, administrative
83. The Court's only justification for making corporations vicariously lia-
ble for their agents' acts was that deciding otherwise would cause many of-
fenses to go unpunished. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United
States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909).
84. I& at 494.
85. Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369, 379 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 788 (1943).
86. New York Cent, 212 U.S. at 496 (emphasis added).
87. Brickey, supra note 15, at 621-22; Canfield, supra note 3, at 472.
88. Developments, supra note 3, at 1301-11.
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agencies have grown dramatically in size, expertise, and power
to regulate.8 9 As President Kennedy stated in a 1961 message
to Congress, "[t]he responsibilities with which [the regulatory
agencies] have been entrusted permeate every sphere and al-
most every activity of our national life."9° Today, 116 federal
agencies have a huge impact on our economy. 91 Although the
growth of state agencies has been slower, "[t]he average state
probably has more than one hundred agencies with powers of
adjudication or rulemaking or both."92
Between federal agencies such as the SEC, EPA, EEOC,
OSHA, IRS, ICC, FTC, NLRB, SBA and various state tax, em-
ployment, and consumer agencies, layers of government regu-
late virtually every corporation. Although there are many
criticisms of administrative regulation, agencies potentially pro-
vide the continuity criminal enforcement lacks. By definition,
criminal enforcement occurs only after an egregious failure to
89. During its first 100 years, the federal government established agencies
mainly to promote the country and to facilitate commerce. CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, INC., FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY 13 (5th ed. 1986). These
agencies included the Army Corps of Engineers (1824), Patent and Trademark
Office (1836), Internal Revenue Service (1862), Comptroller of the Currency
(1863), Copyright Office of the Library of Congress (1870), Bureau of Fisheries
(1871), and Civil Service Commission (1883). Id. The Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC), created in 1887, was the federal government's first attempt
"to exercise its constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce." Id.
at 13. It was twenty-three years, however, before the ICC achieved even the
power to set original rates or investigate new rate proposals. I&. at 14.
Between 1915 and the New Deal, Congress established seven additional
agencies, including the Coast Guard (1915), Tariff Commission (1916), Com-
modities Exchange Authority (1922), Customs Service (1927), Federal Radio
Commission (1927), Federal Power Commission (1930), and Food and Drug
Administration (1931). I& at 15. With the 1929 depression, there was "an un-
precedented surge of administrative regulation," id. at 15, and social programs
that marked a fundamental shift away from the limited role that the federal
government had previously filled in the nation's economic and social life. Id
at 17. This surge set the stage for the Great Society programs of the 1960s,
which set forth another burst of growth in administrative agencies, id at 17:
"The 1970s witnessed the most dramatic increase in federal regulatory activity
ever." Id at 3.
90. 107 CONG. REC. 5847 (1961).
91. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., supra note 89, at 2. The General
Accounting Office tabulated the number of agencies in a 1978 report that fo-
cused on regulatory programs that "have an impact on the private sector with-
out categorizing them by specific regulatory definition." Id Various statistics
emphasize the impact of these agencies on today's economy: The "Federal
Register which publishes all proposed and final regulations [has] skyrocketed
from 9,562 pages in 1960 to 74,120 pages in 1980." Id. at 3. "One survey found
that currently federal departments and agencies send out more than 9,800 dif-
ferent types of forms and received 556 million responses." Id.
92. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4 (5th ed. 1973).
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comply with the law. Agencies, on the other hand, have the
power to monitor continuing corporate activity before lapses
become egregious. In short, a strong argument can be made
that because agencies have the expertise and ability to police
corporations, we should rely on agencies to shoulder most of
the enforcement responsibility. As a corollary, to the extent
agencies lack adequate resources to realize their enforcement
potential, we should see that they get more resources.
Unfortunately, many courts still parrot the Supreme
Court's view that criminal liability is the only available govern-
mental response to corporate misbehavior. For example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in af-
firming the conviction of a corporate wholesaler of fruits and
vegetables, noted that to not impose criminal liability in this
case "[was] to immunize the offender who really benefits and
open wide the door for evasion." 93
As noted, controlling corporate behavior through the impo-
sition of criminal liability on individuals within the corporation
is a second option to corporate criminal liability. The govern-
ment should criminally prosecute individuals within an organi-
zation who violate the law. It must be acknowledged, however,
that this avenue has limited ability to deter corporate agents
from future illegal activity. This is true for two reasons. First,
internal corporate pressure that can overcome the deterrent
value of individual criminal liability often exists.94 This pres-
sure may be the subtle indoctrination of employees so that they
do not perceive their conduct as illegal, or it may consist of
more draconian measures such as replacing employees who do
not succumb to such pressure. Second, it is often difficult to de-
cipher which individuals within an organization are responsible
for the criminal act.95 When this is the case, there can be no
criminal prosecution of individual corporate employees.
There is, however, a response to each of these problems.
The corporate ethos standard of liability proposed herein helps
remedy the first problem by holding criminally liable any cor-
93. United States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 328 U.S. 869 (1946).
94. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 commentary at 148-49 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1956) ("For there are probably cases in which the economic pressures within
the corporate body are sufficiently potent to tempt individuals to hazard per-
sonal liability for the sake of company gain ....").
95. Note, supra note 17, at 553-554 & n.35; see, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.07 commentary at 149-50 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1956); Bucy, Fraud by Fright:
White Collar Crime by Health Care Providers, 67 N.C.L. REv. 855, 878 (1989).
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poration that pressures employees to violate the law. The sec-
ond problem, that it is often difficult to determine which
corporate agents are responsible for the criminal act, although
factually correct, does not justify use of a standard of liability
that allows convictions of law-abiding corporation.
The third flaw in the New York Central reasoning is its
failure to consider the conceptual alternatives to broad respon-
deat superior as the standard for corporate criminal liability.
The Supreme Court assumed it had two options for imposing
criminal liability on corporations: respondeat superior 96 or no
criminal liability.97 Such a rigid view of its options is under-
standable given the posture of the case before the Court and
the historical place of this opinion. Almost a full century has
passed since this decision, however. During this time, there has
been considerable experience with and substantial scholarship
on the nature of organizations. The New York Central Court's
simplistic choice between two options, while understandable, ig-
nores the subtleties of organizational behavior that courts are
now better able to identify and appreciate.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court in New York Central was
presented with a broad vicarious liability standard of corporate
criminal liability and asked to reject it in favor of no liability.
The Court opted for the former, thereby giving our criminal
justice system the tool of respondeat superior to confront the
theoretical morass presented by corporate criminal liability. In
adopting this approach, the Court uncritically borrowed a con-
cept appropriate fo one type of legal problem and used it for
another, overgeneralized the need for corporate criminal liabil-
ity, and failed to assess the options to its chosen approach. The
96. In this case, New York Central could be liable for acts of its assistant
traffic manager because of the language in the Elkins Act, under which the
railroad was prosecuted. The applicable portion of this statute provided a
broad respondeat superior standard:
In construing and enforcing the provisions of this section, the act,
omission or failure of any officer, agent, or other person acting for or
employed by any common carrier or shipper, acting within the scope
of his employment shall in every case be also deemed to be the act,
omission, or failure of such carrier as well as that of the person.
49 U.S.C. § 41(2) (1906), repealed by Interstate Commerce Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-473, § 4(a)-(b), 92 Stat. 1466, 1470, quoted in New York Cent, 212 U.S. at
496.
97. In 1909, the question whether corporations should be liable for crimes
of intent was seriously debated. Cf. Brickey, supra note 2, at 413 (stating that
only certain classes of crimes could be committed by corporations); Canfield,
supra note 3, at 472-77 (discussion whether corporation could be liable for
crimes involving mens rea).
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Court did so because it determined that practical necessity de-
manded criminal liability of corporations, but the Court's ends-
justify-the-means approach was short-sighted and has created
more problems than it solved. The New York Central opinion
short-circuited a critical and thorough search for an appropriate
standard of corporate criminal liability, condemned the crimi-
nal justice system and corporate actors to groping efforts, at
best, to apply this standard, and provided ammunition to those
who would decry any corporate criminal liability. In short, the
Court gave as precedent a sledgehammer, when a scalpel is
needed. As in other areas where sophisticated tools have re-
placed primitive ones, the criminal law needs a more sophisti-
cated and refined mechanism for imposing corporate criminal
liability.
II. THE CORPORATE ETHOS STANDARD OF
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The standard of corporate criminal liability proposed
herein focuses on the "ethos"98 of a corporation and provides as
follows: A corporation should be held criminally liable only
when its ethos encourages criminal conduct by agents of the
corporation. Under this standard, the government must prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, four elements: (1) a corporate ethos
(2) that encourages (3) criminal conduct (4) by agents of the
corporation.
A. PROVING THE ELEMENTS
1. The Existence of a Corporate Ethos
Aristotle developed the rich concept "ethos" to describe
one component of a successful orator. In the third century
B.C.,99 the study of rhetoric was so popular in Greece that
it dominated the traditional education of young men preparing
for public life.100 Several factors contributed to rhetoric's
importance. Most young men aspired to be a politician or
statesman, and public speaking was an "indispensable accom-
98. This test focuses on corporate "ethos" rather than more popular terms
such as corporate culture or corporate personality. These latter terms both
have specialized meanings within their originating disciplines of anthropology
and psychology, respectively, that may prove limiting. Also, in their popular-
ity, both terms have become homogenized, losing much of their clarity.
99. A. GRANT, ARISTOTLE, A (1880).
100. E. COPE, AN INTRODUCTION To ARISTOTLE's RHETORic 2 (1867).
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plishment"''1 1 for any politician. In addition, Athens was an
"unusually litigious" society, and the law required that every
citizen plead his own case in a court of law.10 2 In this environ-
ment, oratorical skills were necessary, advantageous, and cher-
ished.10 3 Some citizens, including Aristotle, were not pleased
with this emphasis on rhetoric, believing that young men culti-
vated "quickness and dexterity" at the expense of sound logic,
scientific inquiry, veracity and sincerity.' °4 In Aristotle's years
as a young adult, Isocrates' school of rhetoric was at the height
of its popularity.10 5 The factitious and vacuous approach that
this school fostered apparently so moved Aristotle that he es-
tablished a rival school of oratory.10 6 In his three part work en-
titled Rhetoric, Aristotle advanced his views on oratory, and
distinguished the views of his rivals'. Aristotle argued that the
most important ingredient of successful oratory was systematic
logic and scientific exposition.10 7 He identified three modes of
persuasion by which a speaker communicated his logic and ex-
position.' 08 One was the content of the speech.10 9 Another was
putting the audience in a frame of mind responsive to the argu-
ments made," 0 a mode that required an analysis of the human
character, motives, and feelings of the audience. The third
mode of persuasion - "'Oog" or ethos - "depend[ed] on the
personal character of the speaker.""' According to one Aris-
totelean scholar,
This kind of ',log is most important... to the success of the speech:
for the opinion of any audience as to the credibility of the speaker de-
pends mainly upon the view they take of his intentions and character
intellectual and moral; his ability to form a judgment, his integrity
and truthfulness and his disposition toward themselves, to one they
101. Id. at 1.
102. Id at 2.
103. Id
104. Id at 2-3.
105. Id at x.
106. Id
107. Id at 4.
108. ARISTOTLE, Rhetoric, in THE BASIc WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1329 (R. Mc-
Keon ed. 1941) (bk. I, ch. 1)).
109. Id-
110. Id- at 1379-1412 (bk. II, ch. 1-19). Aristotle terms this component of
Public Speaking as iO/ and devoted some attention to distinguishing between
'0og and iei. E. COPE, supra note 100, at 108-13. Aristotle also distinguished
another variety of '6og, which appears only in Rhetoric, Book III. It is a paint-
ing or ornament and aids in the proof. Id at 112; ARISTOTLE, supra note 108,
at 1442 (bk. III, ch. 16.8-9).
111. ARISTOLE, supra note 108, at 1329 (bk. I, ch. 2); see also id. at 1353-54
(further discussion of the speaker's character).
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will listen with attention, respect and favor; another if they look upon
him as of the opposite character, they will regard with dislike and im-
patience and an inclination to disbelief and criticism.I 1
Aristotle's notion of ethos has continued in our modem so-
ciety. Today, the term refers to the characteristic spirit or
prevalent tone of sentiment of a community, institution or sys-
tem."3 The historical concept of ethos is appropriate for our
consideration of a corporation's characteristic spirit or preva-
lent tone of sentiment. Aristotle's "ethos" focused on the ab-
stract, intangible character of a speaker that was separate from
the substance of the speaker's words. So too, the notion of cor-
porate ethos is the abstract, and intangible, character of a cor-
poration separate from the substance of what it actually does,
whether manufacturing, retailing, finance or other activity.
And like Aristotle's speakers, each corporation has a distinctive
ethos or "characteristic spirit." Superficial things such as the
manner of dress and the camaraderie of the employees as well
as formal, written goals and policies evidence this ethos. Addi-
tionally, a corporation's ethos may be tied to one or a few indi-
viduals or it may transcend individuals and even generations.
Scholars and practitioners of organizational theory have
long recognized that organizations differ from each other: "It is
not true that all big companies are the same - they aren't....
Companies develop their own distinctive personality and ethos
which is so ingrained, so much a part of them, that the corpo-
rate identity expresses itself in their every action."'1 4
Much of the voluminous business literature on corporate
culture is premised on the notion that organizations have dis-
tinctive cultures." 5 For example, one commentator has de-
scribed the distinct personalities of the world's dominant oil
112. E. COPE, supra note 100, at 109-10.
113. WEBsTE's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIoNARY 781 (1971).
114. W. OLINs, THE CORPORATE PERSONALTY 82 (1978).
115. Generally, corporate culture is used to signify "the pattern of shared
beliefs and values that give the members of an institution meaning and pro-
vide them with the rules for behavior in their organization." S. DAVIS, MAN-
AGING CORPORATE CULTURE 1 n.1 (1984). Business literature has exploded
with panaceas for assessing and manipulating a corporation's culture. See, e.g.,
F. SCHUSTER, THE SCHUSTER REPORT ix (1986) ("Do you want your employees
to be more productive? ... The Schuster Report presents a strategy for imple-
menting change in an organization's culture to promote innovation, productiv-
ity, excellence, and success."); see also S. DAVIS, supra, at 1-2 ("My purpose in
writing this book is to share what I have learned about managing corporate
cultures."); D. GRAVES, CORPORATE CuLTURE-DIAGNOsIs AND CHANGE 129
(1986) ("Changing the culture: ... Is there an easy solution?"); id at viii ("In
[this book] there is... some advice about changing the culture...").
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companies 116 as follows: Texaco "with its selfishness and greed
cultivates a reputation for meanness and secrecy";" 7 Mobil "is
in many ways the most sophisticated of American [oil compa-
nies] ... much concerned with communications and image"; s8
Exxon maintains a "tranquil style.""19 Its headquarters are "si-
lent" and "elegant," its atmosphere "rarefied,"'2 0 Exxon is "full
of rhetorics of global responsibilities [and] likes to stress that it
serves not only its American shareholders but all the nations
where it operates."''1 Shell, "lordly and sedate," demonstrates
an "obsessive introversion" and "self containment"'22 -
"Shellmen ... cultivate ... diplomacy [and]... prefer not to
talk about anything as squalid as profits."''
In their popular work, Corporate Cultures, Deal and Ken-
nedy identify five elements of a company's culture: business
environment, values, heroes, rites and rituals, and cultural net-
work.24 By analyzing these elements, these authors develop
four types of corporate cultures: the "Tough-guy, Macho" cul-
ture, where stakes are high and feedback is quick (construction
and entertainment companies);25 the "Work hard/Play hard"
culture, where the employees live in a world of small risks -
no one sale will make or break a player (real estate and door-
to-door sales);2 6 the "Bet-Your-Company" culture, where high
risk but slow feedback prevails because players often must in-
vest millions in a project that takes years to develop (capital
goods and oil companies);2 7 and the "process" culture where
the low risk and slow feedback forces employees to focus on
how they do something, not what they do (utilities and insur-
ance companies).2 8
Peters and Waterman are two organizational scholars
whose work builds on the premise that corporations have dis-
116. A. SAMPSON, THE SEVEN SsTEns 185 (1975).
117. Id at 196-97.
118. Id, at 193.
119. Id. at 8. In 1973, when Sampson researched Exxon, Exxon was by as-
sets the largest company in the world. It had 300,000 shareholders, its subsidi-
aries operated in a hundred countries, and its profits were a world record for
any company in history - $2.5 billion. Id
120. Id at 9.
121. Id at 191.
122. Id at 11.
123. I&
124. T. DEAL & A. KENNEDY, CORPORATE CULTuREs 13-15 (1982).
125. Id at 108-11.
126. Id. at 113-16.
127. Id at 116-19.
128. Id. at 119-23.
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tinct cultures. Their study of companies that demonstrated or-
ganizational effectiveness and management excellence 2 9
uncovered eight characteristics of the "excellent company."'130
The "excellent" companies maintain cultures that incorporate
certain values, such as a strong recognition and respect for the
customer's needs as well as the needs of employees to control
their own destiny.131 Poorer performing companies also often
have strong cultures, but dysfunctional ones that usually focus
on internal politics rather than on the customer, or on "the
numbers" rather than on the product and the people who make
and sell it. 132
Sometimes the culture of a corporation is visible in very
specific contexts. Christopher Stone demonstrates this point
through a comparison of worker safety records in coal mines
owned by traditional coal mining companies and those owned
and operated by steel firms3SS The mining companies exper-
ienced an average of 0.78 deaths and 40.61 injuries per, million
man-hours worked whereas the steel companies experienced an
average of 0.36 deaths and 7.50 injuries per million man-hours
worked.'2 4 Stone attributes this tremendous disparity to a dif-
ference in culture and values: The coal companies were accus-
tomed to accepting a great loss of life and limbs; the steel
companies were not and would not tolerate poor safety
performance.1 S
For criminal justice purposes, some of the most interesting
work on organizational character has been conducted by soci-
ologists who have examined the commission of corporate crime
to determine the characteristics of lawful and unlawful organi-
zations.'36 These scholars suggest that certain social structures
129. T. PETERS & R. WATERMAN, IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE: LESSONS
FROM AMERICA'S BEST RUN CORPORATIONS 13-15 (1982).
130. Id at 26, 80.
131. Id. at 80.
132. Id- at 13.
133. C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 238 (1975).
134. Id-
135. Id.
136. Philosopher Peter French wrote a fascinating work on organizational
character. French points out that corporate decisions are sometimes made by
"intentional actors that are not all of the same biological species." P. FRENCH,
supra note 15, at 46. As French notes:
When the corporate act is consistent with an instantiation or imple-
mentation of established corporate policy; then it is proper to describe
it as having been done for corporate reasons, as having been caused by
a corporate desire coupled with a corporate belief and so, in other
words, as corporate intentional.
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and processes internal to an organization encourage unlawful
behavior.'3 7
Marshall Clinard interviewed sixty-four retired middle
management employees of fifty-one Fortune 500 corporations'3 8
engaged in industrial manufacturing.13 9 Clinard focused his
study on unethical as well as unlawful behavior.140 Through
his interviews, Clinard found that most of the executives be-
lieved that "unethical corporate behavior can usually be traced
to internal rather than external forces."'141 The interviewees
identified two internal factors as primarily determinative of
whether the corporation promoted lawful or unlawful behavior.
The first was top management.'4 The interviewees portrayed
top management as generally knowledgeable about the unethi-
cal or unlawful activity before or after it occurred. Not surpris-
ingly, they therefore deemed top management to be "largely
responsible for the unethical or illegal behavior within a corpo-
ration.' 143 The interviewees also associated the following man-
agement characteristics with the law-abiding corporation: an
appreciation of applicable government regulations, explicit in-
structions and enforcement of these regulations, open lines of
communication between top and middle management about
compliance problems, and stable and respected leadership that
came from within the corporate ranks.'" The second factor
identified by the interviewees as influencing a corporation's
propensity to comply with the law was the internal pressure on
middle management to show a profit and maintain satisfactory
employee relations. 45
Interestingly, the executives thought that these two inter-
nal factors contributed more to whether a corporation complied
with the law than did the external factors such as a poor finan-
Ii at 44.
137. M. CLINARD, CORPORATE ETHics AND CRIME 122 (1983); Vaughan, To-
ward Understanding Unlawful Organizational Behavior, 80 MIc. L. REV.
1377, 1378 (1982); see also Fisse, supra note 3, at 1163 (offenses committed at-
tributed to defective checking and communications procedures).
138. M. CLINARD, supra note 137, at 24.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 35. When studying illegal behavior, such co-mingling may be
problematic but it seems appropriate given the lack of legal training of the
managers in Clinard's sample. As one executive stated: "Law violations are
about the same as ethics except in the former you go to jail." Id. at 132.
141. Id. at 69.
142. Id. at 132.
143. Id. at 71.
144. Id. at 74, 132, 138-39, 150-51.
145. Id. at 91, 140-44.
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cial situation, unfair practices of competitors, or the type of in-
dustry.46 This focus on internal rather than external factors
supports the view that an ethos developed within a corporation
can encourage, or discourage, criminal conduct by corporate
employees.
In Controlling Unlawful Organizational Behavior,147 Di-
ane Vaughan examines one case study of organizational crime:
Revco Inc., which in 1977, pled guilty to submitting false medi-
caid claims totalling $521,521.12.148 Drawing on this case study,
Vaughan analyzes the relationship between corporate struc-
tural factors and unlawful behavior. 49 She concludes that the
"[o]rganizational processes.., create an internal moral and in-
tellectual world" in which individuals within the organization
are encouraged to engage in unlawful behavior 50 These orga-
nizational processes include internal education and training, re-
ward mechanisms, and informational processing and recording
methods.15 ' Vaughan notes that the organizational processes
that encourage unlawful behavior "may vary by subunit of an
organization, or by position within a subunit and over time.' 52
One can draw several clear conclusions from these works
on corporate culture: (1) each corporation is distinctive and
draws its uniqueness from a complex combination of formal
and informal factors; (2) the formal and informal structure of a
corporation can promote, or discourage, violations of the law;
and (3) this structure is identifiable, observable, and malleable.
In light of such conclusions, a standard of criminal liability that
fails to recognize the unique character of corporations or fails
to promote law-abiding behavior by such corporations is
unjustified.
2. A Corporate Ethos that "Encourages"
To apply this standard of liability, it is not necessary to as-
certain the overall and complete ethos of an organization. The
corporate ethos standard is concerned only with the ethos rele-
vant to the criminal conduct in question. Thus, a corporation's
ethos or "characteristic spirit" toward employees' rights, com-
146. Id. at 69, 144.
147. D. VAUGHAN, CONTROLLING UNLAWFUL ORGAITIONAL BEHAVIOR
(1983).
148. Id at 17.
149. Id at 68-78.
150. Id at 70-71.
151. Id. at 68-78.
152. Id at 87.
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petitors, research and development, marketing, and the like is
relevant only to the extent it sheds light on whether there ex-
ists a corporate ethos that encouraged the particular criminal
conduct at issue.
Identifying the corporate ethos relevant to the criminal be-
havior in question will require a resort to circumstantial evi-
dence, as does proof of intent in every criminal case. Although
the actual evidence available will always turn on the particular
facts of each case, there are certain guides for every factfinder.
When the defendant is an individual, the factfinder looks to the
statements and actions of the defendant before, during, and af-
ter the crime as well as corroboration for and explanations of
such statements and actions. From this information, the
factfinder assesses the defendant's mens rea for the criminal
conduct charged. By comparison, in applying the corporate
ethos standard of liability, the factfinder should look to the fol-
lowing types of facts to determine whether a corporate ethos
existed which encouraged corporate employees to commit the
criminal conduct. If so, the government has proven the corpo-
rate mens rea. These facts concern the internal, formal and in-
formal, structure of the corporation.
Two practical points should be borne in mind when apply-
ing the following factors. First, as noted, sometimes it may not
be possible to determine which individual within an organiza-
tion actually performed the illegal conduct, much less en-
couraged it. The corporate ethos test does not require that the
government prove which individual is at fault. It does, how-
ever, require the government to prove that the criminal con-
duct was committed by a corporate agent and that a corporate
ethos existed that encouraged the criminal conduct. Thus, if
the government shows that the criminal conduct occurred in
the accounting department, proof of a corporate ethos that en-
courages criminal conduct in the research and development di-
vision is not sufficient; only evidence of such an ethos in the
accounting department will suffice. Second, like Aristotle's
speakers who were taught to identify and then to control and
alter their own character to suit their audience, a corporation
can manipulate and control its corporate ethos from within.
Accordingly, the factfinder using a corporate ethos standard of
liability, like an audience listening to a politician, must deter-
mine whether they are observing fact or fiction.
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a. The Hierarchy
The inquiry into corporate hierarchy should begin with the
board of directors' role. Does the board operate as a figurehead
or does it, or any member of it, monitor the corporation's ef-
forts to comply with the law? If the board or any member al-
legedly performs this function, does the board or the member
have the access and resources to do so effectively?
Lockheed provides an example of how a defective board
can contribute to corporate crime. Investigations initiated in
the 1970s revealed that Lockheed regularly bribed foreign offi-
cials.'5 Between 1970 and 1975, corporate agents made $30 mil-
lion to $38 million in questionable payments to win foreign
aircraft sales.'5 Investigators' inquiries revealed that one of
the factors contributing to this bribery was a deficiency in
Lockheed's board of directors. Although the board had an au-
dit committee, this committee "failed to function as it should
because it was shielded from critical information."'-'
Lockheed's subsequent reforms demonstrate the powerful
and productive role that a board can play in establishing a law
abiding ethos. In response to the scandal, the Lockheed board
appointed additional directors, including an auditing director,
who came from outside the corporate structure;'1 substantially
increased the staff assigned to the board's auditing commit-
tee;1 57 made the audit group's budget independent of the groups
that it audited;158 and, opened the lines of communication so
that auditors no longer reported to the heads of their local divi-
sions, but to the Director of Auditing who reported directly to
the Chairman.159 These reforms led to intangible changes as
well: "[N]ow [Lockheed] directors ask probing questions and
demand more detailed information in audit committee reports
that they previously passed without challenge.' 160
In addition to examining the role played by the board of di-
rectors, the factfinder should also examine management's orga-
nizational structure. As Braithwaite stated: "The key to
understanding so much organizational crime... is the way that
153. B. FISSE & J. BRArrHwArrE, THE IMPACr OF PUBICITY ON CORPORATE
OFFENDERs 144 (1983).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 155.
156. IM.
157. Id- at 155-56.
158. Id.
159. Id- at 155.
160. Id at 156.
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organizational complexity can be used to protect people from
... exposure to criminal liability."''1 1 The factfinder should fo-
cus its inquiries on whether management left unattended or in-
accessible positions within the corporation where illegal
behavior could have easily occurred. If positions were left unat-
tended, the factfinder should scrutinize the reason for this: was
there an honest and good faith oversight, or a callous recogni-
tion that if corporate employees commit illegal activity, it is
best done outside the usual channels of supervision?
Braithwaite's study of the pharmaceutical industry provides a
graphic example of the latter. He found that many companies
have systemic policies to protect the chief executive from the
taint of knowledge of illegalities. 162 They do so by having "vice-
presidents responsible for going to jail."'' l The corporate direc-
tors tell the vice presidents: "'I don't want to know how you
do it... just get the job done.' "164
The Revco case, discussed by Vaughan, provides a less dra-
matic, but probably more common example of structural defi-
ciencies that engender criminal conduct. Revco was a
pharmaceutical retailer that filled prescriptions for patients
with Medicaid coverage. 1' The Revco drugstores did not re-
quire Medicaid patients to pay, upon receipt, for their prescrip-
tions; rather, Revco filled the patients' prescriptions and
submitted the claims to the Medicaid program for reimburse-
ment.166 Medicaid then paid Revco directly for all Medicaid
prescriptions filled. By 1975, the Revco stores had a backlog of
approximately $500,000 in Medicaid claims that it had submit-
ted for reimbursement but that the Medicaid program had re-
jected, primarily for clerical reasons such as improperly
completed forms.167 Instead of correcting the forms, Revco em-
ployees (with the help of temporary employees) falsified infor-
mation on the forms and resubmitted the claims to Medicaid
for payment.168 When indicted, Revco, along with two of its
employees, pled no contest to misdemeanor charges of
falsification. 169
161. J. BRArrHWAITE, supra note 11, at 147.
162. J. BRAITHwArrE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUS-
TRY 355-58, 365, 370 (1984).
163. I& at 308.
164. 1I at 322 (quoting the chief executive of an American corporation).
165. D. VAUGHAN, supra note 147, at xii, 137.
166. Id. at 1, 3.
167. Id at 8-9.
168. Id
169. Id. at 16.
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Although neither the corporate minutes nor other official
communications evidenced an official Revco policy supporting
falsification of Medicaid forms, 7 0 an important structural defi-
ciency in Revco's billing system existed. Historically, Revco
had a higher rate of rejection for defective claims than did its
peer companies. Revco's rejection rate ranged from 5.4% to
56.3% of monthly claims filed, for an average monthly rejection
rate of 24.04%. The peer companies had an average monthly
rejection rate of 2% to 6%.171  Applying the corporate ethos
standard, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Revco's
hierarchy was deficient because it sanctioned the initial filing of
defective Medicaid claims, which led to the rejection of the
claims, which in turn led to claim falsifications in an attempt to
recoup the resulting losses.
Christopher Stone provides another example of a systemic
failure in organizational structure that led to criminal conduct.
In the 1960s, Goodrich was developing brakes for the A-7D, a
military aircraft.172 The corporate structure entrusted the test-
ing of the new brake system to the same personnel who had
designed it. 73 A junior engineer calculated that the brake sys-
tem was defective, and repeated safety tests supported his cal-
culation. 7 4 Despite these poor reports, the project went
forward because "test data were apparently fudged."'175
Although the Congressional inquiry found that Goodrich's top
management did not know about the false test data, as Stone
points out, the inadequate system of checks and balances made
Goodrich's organization defective.'7 6 Again, applying the corpo-
rate ethos standard, a reasonable factfinder could find that
Goodrich's hierarchial structure was deficient because it al-
lowed the same individuals to design and test new aircraft.
Although less dramatically probative than the hierarchial
structure of the pharmaceutical companies studied by
Braithwaite, both Revco and Goodrich's structural deficiencies
weigh in favor of finding a corporate ethos that encouraged the
subsequent criminal fraud.
170. In fact, the evidence showed that no one within Revco Inc., other than
the two executives and the temporary employees, knew of the fraud. Id. at 9-
10.
171. Id. at 11.
172. C. STONE, supra note 133, at 165.
173. Id. at 166.
174. Id- at 165.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 166.
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Allied and Exxon illustrate how corporations can
strengthen the management hierarchy to discourage, or at least
not encourage, criminal conduct by corporate employees. For
example, Allied formed a committee on Toxic Risk Assess-
ment, partly in response to its conviction for discharging Ke-
pone into the James River, and partly in response to new
environmental statutes.177 Composed of a vice-president for
medical affairs, a senior attorney, and personnel from various
relevant disciplines (such as toxicology), 178 the committee re-
quires all operating plants to submit a monthly report detailing
any environmental risk that has occurred. In addition, "all per-
sonnel, irrespective of rank, have an obligation" to report any
risk "they believe to be substantial."'179 The committee investi-
gates all complaints and reports back to the person filing the
complaint.18 0
Similarly, after a bribery scandal in the 1970s,181 Exxon re-
vamped its management hierarchy by giving each of its regions
a controller who, aided by an audit team,182 conducts opera-
tional as well as financial audits. These audits "incorporate an
assessment of whether standard operating procedures are ade-
quate to ensure compliance with company policies are in place,
and whether these procedures are being consistently fol-
lowed."1 s The Exxon restructuring also opened the lines of
communication. Auditors can by-pass the controller and report
violations directly to the board of directors. Whenever the con-
troller or the board receives a violation report, the recipient
must send to the person who reported the violation a finding on
177. B. FIssE & J. BRArrHWArrE, supra note 153, at 73.
178. Id.
179. Id
180. Id
181. Id at 168-81.
182. Because of the scope of the audit, engineers as well as financial audi-
tors comprise the audit teams. Id- at 173.
183. Id In addition to increasing the ability to monitor compliance with
the law, there are other advantages to expanding the audits' scope beyond fi-
nances. Because the audit also assesses efficiency, findings are useful in im-
proving the performance of the organization. Id. at 179. In addition, managers
will be more willing to endure the inconvenience of an audit; further, the com-
prehensiveness of the control system discourages employee thefts, or enhances
the company's ability to discover those thefts more quickly. Id. at 179-80.
One potential drawback to a system with as much control as Exxon's is
that "the 'environment of control,' which Exxon has so successfully created,
might inhibit lateral thinking toward solutions for improving... or risk-pre-
vention." Id at 181. The corporate environment should also be of "imagina-
tive problem solving." Id.
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whether a violation has occurred, and if it has, what action will
be taken.'84 Moreover, the controller must ensure that any
needed remedial action is, in fact, implemented.
In conclusion, the factfinder should examine the corporate
hierarchy to determine if a corporate ethos existed that en-
couraged the criminal conduct at issue. If either the board of
directors or the management were organized in a way that en-
couraged criminal activity, even indirectly as in the Revco and
Goodrich examples, the factfinder should weigh this factor in
favor of finding the existence of such an ethos, and thus, of
finding the corporation criminally liable. On the other hand,
the factfinder should weigh the implementation of procedures,
such as those employed at Allied and Exxon, against finding
the existence of such an ethos and, consequently, against find-
ing corporate criminal liability, even though corporate agents
committed the criminal act.
b. Corporate Goals
When considering the corporate goals, the factfinder
should examine whether the goals set by the corporation for
the relevant division, subsidiary, or employee promote lawful
behavior or are so unrealistic that they encourage illegal behav-
ior. As the American Law Institute noted in devising the
Model Penal Code's standard of corporate criminal liability,
"the economic pressures within the corporate body [may be]
sufficiently potent to tempt individuals to hazard personal lia-
bility for the sake of company gain. s185
An apt example of this was Ford's ambitious production
and earnings goals for 1973: It was imperative that Ford obtain
EPA certification of its emission testing standards if it was to
meet these goals.' 86 The Company was unable to obtain certifi-
cation legitimately, so Ford employees tampered with its 1973
engines to obtain the needed certification. 8 7 By comparison
Exxon, following its bribery scandal, demonstrates goals a cor-
poration can establish to promote compliance with the law. In
a memorandum sent to all employees, Exxon stated:
An overly-ambitious employee might have the mistaken idea that we
do not care how results are obtained, as long as he gets results. He
might think it best not to tell higher management all that he is doing,
184. I& at 175.
185. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 commentary at 158-59 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1956) 174.
186. B. FISSE & J. BRArrHwArrE, supra note 153, at 56.
187. Id. at 55.
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not to record all transactions accurately in his books and records, and
to deceive the Corporation's internal and external auditors. He would
be wrong on all counts.
We do care how we get results. We expect compliance with our
standard of integrity throughout the organization. We will not toler-
ate an employee who achieves results at the cost of violation of laws
or unscrupulous dealing. By the same token, we will support, and
we expect you to support, an employee who passes up an opportunity
or advantage which can only be secured at the sacrifice of
principle .... 188
Rarely will cases be as extreme as the Ford and Exxon ex-
amples. The point, however, is that institutional goals can en-
courage, or discourage, illegal activity by corporate employees.
When illegal activity is encouraged, such goals weigh in favor of
imposing criminal liability on a corporation. When the goals
discourage illegal aciivity, they mitigate against a finding of
criminal liability, even though corporate employees committed
illegal acts.
c. Educating Corporate Employees about Legal Requirements
In some corporations, employees have the opportunity to
disobey, or comply with, the law many times each day. The
duty of such corporations to educate their employees about
legal requirements is greater than that of corporations where
employees do not have such opportunities. Likewise, a corpora-
tion's duty to educate its employees about legal requirements
varies with the type of employee. For example, few would disa-
gree that a banking corporation has a duty to educate all of its
tellers about reporting requirements for cash transactions, but
that it has no duty to so educate its janitorial employees. The
factfinder, therefore, should consider whether the corporation
has made reasonable efforts to educate its employees about
legal requirements. The following types of inquiries are rele-
188. Id at 171. It is interesting to compare the directness of Exxon's state-
ment to its employees to the ambiguous language of the Standards of Business
Ethics and Conduct that McDonnell Douglas distributed to its employees. The
McDonnell Douglas "vague and platitudinous" document consists of 1500
words and covers eleven topics ranging from conflicts of interests to equal op-
portunity working conditions. Id. at 166.
Exxon's communique to its employees, like all of the Exxon reforms dis-
cussed herein, see supra text accompanying notes 181-84, came in the wake of
its 1970s bribery scandal. As this communique aptly demonstrates, the re-
forms were geared to financial malfeasance. One has to wonder whether the
1990 oil spill at Valdez, Alaska, with resulting criminal liability for Exxon,
would have occurred if Exxon had given the same attention to environmental
responsibilities. See Cushman, supra note 4.
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vant in assessing this factor: Are the appropriate employees in-
formed of regulatory changes that affect their duties? Are the
new regulations explained in a comprehensible manner? Do
middle management executives hold regular meetings to dis-
cuss problems of compliance? Is the corporate legal staff avail-
able for discussions on compliance? Does middle management
have specific training programs in the areas of ethics and gov-
ernment regulation?
Like the other internal controls discussed herein, educa-
tional programs are viable mechanisms for controlling criminal
conduct. Fisse and Braithwaite's study of corporate offenders
aptly demonstrates this point. After its bribery scandal, Lock-
heed assumed the responsibility of educating its staff: "Annu-
ally, the senior vice-president and general counsel, chief
counsel, and assistant chief counsel tour all operating facilities
to refresh managers' consciousness of compliance responsibili-
ties and to answer questions about law observance."189 Such ef-
forts must affect employees. As Fisse and Braithwaite noted,
"[i]t is unusual in large corporations for the three top lawyers
to be given an educational mission as a primary part of their
responsibilities." 190
Exxon made a similar effort to educate its employees after
its bribery scandal. Every three years, each Exxon subsidiary
has a "business practice review" in which managers review the
objectives of corporate ethics policies and assess current prac-
tices.191 A beneficial side effect, according to the controller re-
sponsible for the reviews, was that the reviews "helped the
managers in the field to understand the reasons for many of
the requirements imposed on them.' 192
The corporate ethos standard of liability does not require
all corporations to institute educational efforts similar to those
at Lockheed and Exxon. This standard, however, does reward
a corporation that does so, if and when its employees commit
criminal acts. Applying this standard, the factfinder is less
likely to hold criminally liable a corporation that has imple-
mented viable educational programs than a corporation that
has no such programs.
189. B. FISSE & J. BRArrHWArrE, supra note 153, at 158.
190. Id-
191. Id at 178.
192. Id.
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d. Monitoring Compliance with Legal Requirements
In Clinard's study, middle managers cited effective em-
ployee monitoring as one of the practices important in cultivat-
ing an ethical corporation.193  A factfinder applying the
corporate ethos standard thus should determine how well the
corporation monitors employee compliance with applicable
legal requirements. Are internal audits conducted? Are chan-
nels of communication open throughout the management hier-
archy? Are employees required to sign a statement each year
indicating that they are familiar with pertinent government
regulations and indicating that they realize such violations will
result in dismissal? Is there an ombudsman?
The internal audit is an important monitoring device. Vir-
tually every corporation, regardless of size, performs some type
of internal audit. The factfinder applying the corporate ethos
standard should focus on the effectiveness of this audit. The
corporate offenders Fisse and Braithwaite studied often insti-
tuted reforms to enhance the credibility of the internal audit
and auditors.194 In eleven of the seventeen case studies they
examined, "compliance in the organization was strengthened
either through increased staff, seniority, or added powers, or all
three."'195 In some cases, management gave increased power to
those responsible for monitoring compliance. 1' For example,
after its Kepone crisis, Allied management upgraded its envi-
ronmental affairs manager to vice-president level,'197 selected a
vice-president to supervise a Toxic Risk Assessment Commit-
tee,198 and added an Environmental Committee to the Board of
Directors.199
Effective internal monitoring also requires open channels
of communication. Factfinders must determine whether there
is an open door policy that encourages employees to consult
with top management regarding problems of ethics and compli-
ance with government regulations and if not, why not. One of
the surprising findings of Clinard's study of middle managers
was that top management knew about violations before or
shortly after they occurred.20 0 If this is true, poor channels of
193. M. CLINARD, supra note 137, at 159.
194. B. FISSE & J. BRArrHWAITE, supra note 153, at 156, 234.
195. Id at 233.
196. See id- at 234.
197. Id- at 72.
198. Id- at 73.
199. Id.
200. M. CLINARD, supra note 137, at 138.
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communication to top management should be a red flag to
factfinders applying the corporate ethos standard: Factfinders
should ascertain whether channels of communication are open
and effective. If not, is the ineffectiveness accidental or
planned?
Compliance letters are one way to communicate legal re-
sponsibilities to corporate employees. 201 For example, Lock-
heed requires that all personnel with financial responsibilities
"sign a letter twice a year indicating that to the best of their
knowledge, the business... of the company under their control
has been conducted in accordance with Lockheed's Principles
of Business Conduct.'20 2 General Electric started similar re-
quirements after its price fixing scandal in the early 1960s, 203 as
did Allied Chemical after its Kepone crisis,204 Ford after its
prosecution for fraudulent emission testing,20 5 Exxon 2°6 and
McDonnell Douglas20 7 after their bribery scandals, ITT after its
disclosure of covert actions in Chili,20 8 IBM after its antitrust
prosecution,209 and Searle after the FDA, Senate and grand
jury investigations of its drug testing procedures. 210 Through
these compliance letters, the signing officer establishes herself
as the person responsible if illegality does occur.
Finally, the factfinder should consider whether a corpora-
tion has an ombudsman to receive employee complaints and
concerns about legal compliance. If there is such an
ombudsman, the factfinder should assess the ombudsman's ef-
fectiveness and the protection afforded those employees who
bring information to the ombudsman. Factfinders should bear
in mind that an ombudsman outside the corporate hierarchy
provides greater employee protection.21'
In conclusion, a corporation's efforts to monitor employee
201. See B. FISSE & J. BR.ArmwAIrE, supra note 153, at 234.
202. Id at 156.
203. Id at 182, 234.
204. Id. at 63, 234.
205. Id- at 55, 234.
206. Id at 168, 234.
207. Id at 161, 234.
208. Id- at 124, 234.
209. Id. at 197, 234.
210. Id. at 136-39, 234.
211. For a discussion of the need for an ombudsman that "whistle-blowers"
can consult, see WHISTLE BLOWING: THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON PRO-
FESSIONAL REsPONSMLrTY 190-91, 194-96 (R. Nader, P. Petkas & K. Blackwell
eds. 1972). Cf. Whistle Blower Protection Act of 1989, § 2, 5 U.S.C. § 1201
(Supp. 1990) (providing protection for employees who report wrongdoing to
the government).
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compliance with the law is relevant in assessing whether there
exists a corporate ethos that encouraged corporate employees
to commit criminal conduct. The factfinder should examine the
caliber of the internal audit and auditors, the structural lines of
communication, the use of compliance letters, and the role of
an ombudsman when evaluating these monitoring efforts.
e. Investigating the Current Offense
The factfinder also should examine the criminal violation
at issue to determine who did it, who contributed to its success,
and which (if any) higher echelon officials "recklessly toler-
ated" it. At this point, the corporate ethos standard deviates
from current standards for corporate criminal liability. Under
traditional respondeat superior doctrine, if a corporate agent in-
tentionally commits a criminal offense while acting within the
scope of her duties and for the benefit of the corporation, the
corporation is guilty.212 Under the MPC standard, if higher
echelon officials participate in or recklessly tolerate the of-
fense, corporate liability results.213 Under the corporate ethos
standard, however, such facts are not conclusive. The govern-
ment must go further and demonstrate that the corporation en-
couraged this conduct. Admittedly, the chances of finding a
corporate ethos that encouraged the criminal conduct increase
if higher echelon officials are involved, but such officials' par-
ticipation or acquiescence is not decisive. Rather, the higher
level officials' conduct is simply more relevant than lower level
officials' participation.
f. Corporate Reaction to Past Violations and Violators
According to Clinard's study, a corporation's reaction to a
prior violation of the law can be one of the more important fac-
tors encouraging ethical patterns in the corporation: "[P]rior
enforcement actions .. .not only affected compliance in the
particular area where it was brought but also had tended to af-
fect compliance with government regulations generally.'2 14
Clearly, the factfinder should consider as relevant the prior
treatment of employees who violated the law. Were the viola-
tors disciplined, or promoted? Did the corporation reimburse
the violators for criminal or civil fines assessed in their individ-
ual capacity or pay their attorneys fees? What steps did the
212. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.10(a) (2d ed. 1986).
213. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
214. M. CLINARD, supra note 137, at 157.
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corporation take to prevent such action from occurring in the
future: Did the corporation make efforts to rectify the situa-
tion that led to the violations, or did it attempt to conceal the
violations? If the corporation conscientiously and in good faith
attempted to remove the cause of the prior violation, it is un-
likely that an ethos that encourages criminal conduct exists.
However, if the corporation took little or no steps to remedy
the situation, or attempted to conceal misconduct, it is likely
that a corporate ethos exists that should subject the corporation
to liability.
g. Compensation Incentives for Legally Appropriate Behavior
Another factor that affects the corporate ethos is whether
the corporate compensation scheme awards unlawful or lawful
behavior with bonuses, stock options, or other fringe benefits.
For example, is the vice president who was convicted of offer-
ing bribes to foreign businesses promoted because his division
profits were up or, is he fired? Who is rewarded: The plant
manager who has the highest accident rate, or the plant man-
ager who has the best compliance with environmental require-
ments? Is the whistle blower fired, or protected and rewarded?
The values reflected in compensation will permeate an entire
corporation and communicate to employees what behavior on
their part the corporation favors or dislikes.
Allied provides an example of how a corporation can pro-
mote compliance with the law through compensation practices.
After its Kepone conviction, Allied introduced a safety incen-
tive scheme. One third of executives' bonuses relate "to envi-
ronmental compliance, safety, antitrust, civil rights and other
non-fiscal goals."2 15 After instituting this bonus scheme, Allied
experienced a 75% decline in its plant injury record.2 16
Searle 17 and Exxon2 18 provide other examples. At both corpo-
rations, bonuses and salaries depend in part on compliance with
corporate ethics or safety policies. When such a compensation
scheme exists, a finding that the corporate ethos encouraged
the criminal conduct at issue is less likely.
215. B. FISSE & J. BRArrHWArTE, supra note 153, at 73.
216. Hayes, Complying With E.P4.A Rules, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1980, at D1,
col. 3.
217. B. FISSE & J. BRAIrTwArrE, supra note 153, at 141.
218. See id at 176.
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h. Indemnification
One of the more difficult criteria to weigh under the corpo-
rate ethos test relates to the issue of compensation, namely, a
corporation's position on indemnification (or its surrogate, Di-
rectors & Officers Liability Insurance). The difficulty arises be-
cause the current indemnification practice of most corporations
encourages criminal conduct by corporate employees.219 Taking
this factor into account thus weighs in favor of finding almost
every corporation guilty. For this reason, before the factfinders
can fairly weigh a corporation's indemnification policy as part
of the corporate ethos test, corporations must change their cur-
rent indemnification practices. Before suggesting a different
approach toward indemnification - one that does not en-
courage criminal conduct, it is necessary to briefly review the
current indemnification policy that most corporations follow.
Corporations can protect their executives from the finan-
cial burden of legal liability incurred in the exercise of their
corporate duties through two major avenues: (1) indemnifica-
tion by the corporation under authorizing statutes, by-laws, or
ad hoc agreements negotiated between the executive and the
corporation,220 or (2) insurance coverage provided through a Di-
rectors and Officers (D&O) liability policy purchased by the
corporation.221 In the former, the corporation pays the execu-
219. For a discussion of the problems created by current indemnification
practices, see infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
220. As part of their incorporation statute, every state has enacted provi-
sions dealing with indemnification of corporate executives for costs associated
with litigation involving executives. J. BISHOP, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS, INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE 1 6.02 (1985). According to
most statutes, management may indemnify corporate employees under circum-
stances even beyond those set forth in the statute. For example, the Delaware
incorporation statute (the prototype in a majority of the states, see id. 6.03)
provides: "The indemnification ... provided by ... this section shall not be
deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those seeking indemnification
or advancement of expenses may be entitled under any by law, agreement,
vote of stockholders or disinterested directors or otherwise .... " DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (Supp. 1990).
221. Directors and Officers (D&O) liability insurance has spread quickly
since the first policies were sold in the 1960s. Johnston, Corporate Indemnifi-
cation and Liability Insurance for Directors and Officers, 33 Bus. LAw. 1993,
2012 (1978). By 1989, 80% of the 1,537 American corporations surveyed carried
D&O insurance. WYArr Co., 1989 WYATr DIREcrORs AND OFFICERS LIABmrrY
SURVEY 39 (1989).
D&O insurance generally provides two types of coverage. The first type
provides for payment directly to directors and officers in situations when the
corporation cannot reimburse - for example, if the corporation is insolvent or
if the applicable indemnification statute, by-law, or contract does not permit
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tive directly for costs incurred by the executive; in the latter,
the insurer pays the executive for covered costs she incurred,
but the corporation pays the insurance premiums.
Regardless of whether indemnification or D&O Insurance
is the employee's source of reimbursement, two basic types of
costs arise when corporate employees are civilly or criminally
sued regarding their corporate duties: fines or penalties as-
sessed after a judgment of guilty, and attorney fees incurred in
defending the lawsuit. When an executive is acquitted, courts
assess no fine or penalty but the executive will have incurred
attorneys fees. Currently, corporate indemnification practices
and D&O insurance reimburse the acquitted executive for
these attorney fees.222 There can be little question that such
reimbursement to an acquitted executive is proper. The prob-
lem with current indemnification practice arises only when the
executive is found guilty. Although not explicitly allowed,
loopholes often permit corporations to indemnify criminally
convicted executives 22 for fines, penalties, and attorney fees.
reimbursement and, when the corporation will not indemnify, such as after a
hostile take-over. The second type of coverage provides for payment directly
to the corporation as reimbursement for amounts the corporation has paid its
executives pursuant to its indemnification obligations. J. BISHOP, supra note
220, 8.04 (1990); Kerns, Current Developments in Directors' and Officers' Li-
ability Insurance: Duty to Defend, Allocation of Loss, and Advancement of
Expenses, in PRACTICING LAW INsTrruTE, COMMERCIAL LAW & PRACTICE
HANDBOOK SERIES No. 454, DIRECTORs AND OFFIcERs LiAmmnrr INSURANCE
600-601 (1988).
222. For example, under the Delaware statute, indemnification is
mandatory when the executive has been "successful on the merits or other-
wise." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1983).
223. Virtually no indemnification statute, by-law, or ad hoc agreement di-
rectly states that an employee will be indemnified for fines and penalties as-
sessed after judgment, civil or criminal. Bucy, Indemnification of Corporate
Executives Who Have Been Convicted of Crimes: An Assessment and Propo-
sal, 24 IND. L. REV. 279, 287-326 (1991). In practice, however, such reimburse-
ment occurs with frequency. Id.
For example, the Delaware Statute prohibits indemnification only when
the executive or employee is "adjudged" liable for a breach of duty to the cor-
poration. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (Supp. 1990). The word "adjudged"
is significant: If a case never progresses to the point of judgment, this provi-
sion does not bar indemnification. See J. BISHOP, supra note 220, 1 6.03 [7].
Thus, if a civil law suit settles, there is no judgment and the executive may be
reimbursed fully. In the criminal lawsuit, if the executive pleads guilty to
some charges while others are dismissed, the executive has not been "ad-
judged" guilty as to the dismissed charges, and is entitled to indemnification as
to a portion of the expenses attributable to the dismissed charges. See Merritt-
Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 141 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); J.
BISHOP, supra note 220, 6.03 [7].
Furthermore, according to this statutory scheme, even when a corporate
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By comparison and with one possible caveat, D&O insurers
generally do not reimburse a convicted executive for any costs
(fines, penalties, or attorney fees).2 24 The law, however, is un-
settled as to whether the D&O insurer must reimburse the cor-
porate executive for attorney fees as those fees are incurred,
that is, before a finding of guilt or innocence. The court opin-
ions addressing this issue are split. Although they focus on sim-
ilar language in insurance policies, courts have interpreted this
language differently. The courts that hold that an insurer has a
pre-judgment duty to reimburse the defendant for attorney fees
find the pertinent contractual language ambiguous and resolve
the ambiguity against the insurer.2 25 The courts holding other-
executive is convicted of criminal violations, such conviction "shall not, of it-
self, create a presumption that the person did not act in good faith and in a
manner which he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best inter-
ests of the corporation" and "had reasonable cause to believe that his conduct
was unlawful." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1983). A disinterested direc-
tor, independent legal counsel or shareholders, in this order, are to make this
"reasonableness" determination. I& § 145(d). The fact that the insider has
been convicted or pled nolo contendere does not restrict their findings. Id
§ 145(a). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ex-
pressed its skepticism about the impartiality of a review by such individuals.
Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 441
U.S. 471 (1979).
By-laws also tend to be very generous toward corporate executives. Gen-
erally they only limit indemnity coverage if an insider has been "finally ad-
judged" liable to the corporation for negligence or misconduct in the
performance of his duty. J. BISHOP, supra note 220, % 7.09 (1988).
Finally, as might be imagined, ad hoc agreements between the corporation
and employee/officer/director allow corporations and corporate executives the
widest possible discretion to negotiate terms of full indemnification for any
type of fine or penalty. Thus far, courts have only imposed one requirement:
new and independent consideration from that already negotiated between the
parties must support the agreement. See, e.g., Mooney v. Willys-Overland, 204
F.2d 888, 891 (3d Cir. 1953); Koster v. Warren, 176 F. Supp. 459, 461-62 (N.D.
Cal.), aff'd, 297 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1961); Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Serv.,
Inc., 22 Mass. App. 522, 527-28 n.7, 495 N.E.2d 562, 565 n.7 (Ct. App. 1986).
224. The definition of "loss" covered in most policies excludes fines or pen-
alties imposed in a criminal suit or action.
225. See Gon v. First State Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 1989); Okada
v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 823 F.2d 276, 281 (9th Cir. 1987); Little v. MGIC Indem.
Corp., 649 F. Supp. 1460, 1465 (W.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd, 836 F.2d 789 (3d Cir.
1987); Pepsico, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 640 F. Supp. 656, 660 (S.D.N.Y.
1986). The Con policy language was identical to that in Okada. Gon, 871 F.2d
at 868. The Little language was also similar to that in Okada. Little, 649 F.
Supp. at 665. The policy language in Pepsico, unlike the policies in Okada, Lit-
tle and on, did not contain language that expressly allowed the insurer to ad-
vance defense costs at its option. Pepsico, 640 F. Supp. at 660. Thus, the
insurer had agreed to reimburse Pepsico for defense cases "whenever Pepsico
'may be required or permitted by law' to indemnify its directors and officers."
Id The court found that Pepsico, through a by-law, "broadened its ability to
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wise have found that the policies are unambiguous. According
to these courts, insurers must reimburse executives for their at-
torney fees as the bills for these fees become due, rather than
after judgment, only when the policy language specifically pro-
vides for this obligation.226
Whether insurance or indemnification is the source of re-
imbursement, the size of attorney fees makes their immediate
reimbursement an important issue to the executive suspected
or charged with a criminal offense. One expert has estimated
that the average attorney fee for a case involving corporate ex-
ecutives is approximately $693,000. 2-7 The potential defense
costs, however, can be much higher: The Wyatt survey re-
ported one legal defense fee of $3.5 million.228 Given this level
of expense, it is not surprising that corporate executives seek
recovery from insurers and corporations as the bills for their
legal expenses become due.229
If the factfinders ultimately acquit the executive, the pre-
judgment payment of her legal expenses is no problem; this ex-
ecutive has simply received reimbursement to which she is en-
titled. The problem occurs if the factfinders ultimately convict
the executive, because then she has received reimbursement to
which she is not entitled. Although the corporation or D&O in-
surer could seek return of the monies advanced, realistically,
the chances of recovery are slim.
An assessment of the public policy ramifications of reim-
bursing corporate executives is difficult. There are legitimate
business reasons for corporations and insurers to reimburse
corporate directors, officers and employees for legal costs and
penalties incurred in their corporate capacity. In today's litig-
indemnify its directors and officers" so that the advanced attorney fees were
covered. Id. at 661.
226. See, e.g., Zaborac v. American Casualty Co., 663 F. Supp. 330, 334 (C.D.
Ill. 1987).
227. WYATr Co., THE 1988 WYAT DmEcToRs & OFFICERS LiABILrrY SuR-
VEY 12 (1988). The Wyatt Survey noted that only 421 of the 759 claims re-
ported (55.4%) disclosed defense costs. The surveyors did not know if
companies otherwise participating in the survey were reluctant, or unable, to
disclose costs. Id. at 14. The average defense expenses associated with claims
'filed but dropped were $146,150; the average defense expenses for settled
claims were $396,881; and the average defense expenses for claims closed
through litigation were $330,906. id. at 15.
228. WYATr Co., THE 1982 WYAT COMPREHENsIvE REPORT, DIRECTORs &
OFFICER LiABarY/FiDuciARY LiABrITY SURVEY 9 (1982).
229. See Note, Practical Aspects of Directors' and Officers' Liability Insur-
ance-Allocating and Advancing Legal Fees and the Duty to Defend, 32 UCLA
L. REv. 690, 709 (1985).
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ious environment, the promise of such reimbursement often is
necessary to attract qualified individuals.a ° Yet, indemnifica-
tion of convicted defendants could meet these needs without
going as far as it currently does. Reimbursement of expenses
incurred by an acquitted executive is unquestionably appropri-
ate, but allowing corporations or insurers to indemnify execu-
tives guilty of criminal offenses for fines, penalties or attorney
fees is not. The injustice of allowing indemnification to a de-
fendant who has been convicted by a jury or a court is glaring.
Either we respect the factfinders' conclusion of guilt or we do
not. When a corporation or insurer reimburses a convicted de-
fendant, the defendant is significantly relieved of the convic-
tion, and the factfinders' verdict is not honored. Two levels of
justice result: one for those with indemnification, and one for
the rest of us. Furthermore, executives who know that they
can escape liability for their own misconduct through indemni-
fication have less incentive to be truthful, honest, and law-
abiding.231
Whether courts should allow corporations and D&O insur-
ers to reimburse executives for attorney fees as those fees accu-
mulate, or whether they should allow such reimbursement only
after an adjudication of guilt or innocence is an even more com-
plex issue. The argument against such reimbursement is that
any advance payment of attorney fees, especially when the obli-
gation to repay is illusory or non-existent, contravenes public
policy for the same reasons listed above. Two arguments, how-
ever, exist that support advance reimbursement of attorney
fees. First, the sixth amendment guarantees every defendant
the right to counsel.232 This right includes the right to reason-
ably effective counsel.233 It is conceivable that because of the
skill and time required of counsel in the typical white collar
230. Id. at 690; Johnston, supra note 221, at 1993-94. But see Bishop, Sitting
Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Di-
rectors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1102-03 (1968) (arguing that corporate
directors and officers should be exposed to civil liability to deter misconduct,
and that current insurance law over-protects directors and officers).
231. For a discussion of the hazards resulting from indemnity or insurance
coverage of intentional wrongdoing, see Pillai & Tractenberg, Corporate In-
demnification of Directors & Officers: Time for A Reappraisal, 15 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 101, 120-21 (1981); Note, Liability Insurance For Corporate Execu-
tives, 80 HARV. L. REV. 648, 656 (1967). For a forceful argument in favor of
clearly addressing the issue of advancement of fees in D&O policies, see Note,
supra note 229, at 713-15, 717-18.
232. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
233. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-87 (1984) (requiring
that assistance of counsel be effective to meet the sixth amendment standard).
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criminal case,234 some indicted corporate executive will not
have sufficient funds to hire "effective" counsel within the
sixth amendment.
The second argument arises from the corporation's and in-
surer's self-interest: If found guilty of criminal charges, the
corporate executive's conviction may detrimentally influence
civil judgments for which the corporation or D&O insurer may
be liable. Thus, to minimize potential losses in the future,
both a corporation and D&O insurer may find that their best
interests dictate hiring the most effective counsel money can
buy to represent the executive.
To accommodate these competing considerations, corpora-
tions and D&O insurers should be allowed to advance attorney
fees to corporate executives who are grand jury targets or who
have been indicted on criminal offenses, subject to a clear, defi-
nite, and secured obligation on the part of the corporate em-
ployee to repay all funds advanced if ultimately convicted.
Such a requirement is workable and practical - at least one
court has apparently already imposed it.236
In conclusion, a corporation or D&O insurer that reim-
burses corporate executives convicted of criminal conduct for
fines, penalties, or attorney fees sends a message to its other
employees that such conduct is favored. As such, it evidences a
corporate ethos that should subject the corporation to criminal
liability. The problem, however, is that such reimbursement is
the current practice of many corporations. This Article en-
dorses the view that no indemnification should be allowed of
convicted corporate executives. The only caveat concerns pay-
ment for attorney fees as those fees are incurred. This Article
suggests that corporations and insurers may advance these fees,
but only if the advance is fully collateralized. If convicted, the
corporate executive should repay the advanced funds. In apply-
234. See supra text accompanying notes 227-29.
235. The Supreme Court first decided that the litigation of issues in a crim-
inal case could foreclose their relitigation in a related criminal action in Ashe
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970). Lower federal courts have applied this
doctrine in civil proceedings, allowing parties to argue that findings in criminal
cases cannot be relitigated in a subsequent civil case. See, e.g., Wolfson v.
Baker, 623 F.2d 1074, 1079 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Frank, 494 F.2d 145,
160 (2d Cir. 1973), cert denied, 419 U.S. 828 (1974); Cardillo v. Zyla, 486 F.2d
473, 475 (1st Cir. 1973); Coffee, supra note 7, at 442-44; Vestal, Issue Preclusion
and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 IOWA L. REv. 281, 321-37 (1980).
236. Professional Ins. Co. v. Barry, 60 Misc. 2d 424, 429, 303 N.Y.S.2d 556,
561 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (construing what type of "undertaking" is appropriate),
aff'd 32 A.D.2d 898, 302 N.Y.S.2d 722 (App. Div. 1969).
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ing the corporate ethos standard, factfinders may consider in-
demnification beyond that suggested here to be a factor
encouraging the criminal conduct at issue.
i. Conclusion
Most of the factfinders' work in applying the corporate
ethos standard of liability will occur in the analysis of whether
there existed a corporate ethos that encouraged the criminal
conduct. The factfinders should examine the corporation's in-
ternal structure to make this finding. Beginning with the cor-
porate hierarchy, the factfinders should determine whether the
directors' supervision of officers, or management's supervision
of employees was dilatory. Next, factfinders should examine
the corporate goals, as communicated to the employees, to de-
termine whether these goals could be achieved only by disre-
garding the law. The third and fourth factors focus on the
corporation's affirmative steps to educate and monitor employ-
ees and are more relevant in some fields than others. In highly
technical fields where corporate employees daily decide issues
involving legal compliance or violation, the factfinders should
view the corporation's failure to educate its employees as en-
couraging criminal acts. In other fields where few corporate
employees deal in issues affected by law and regulations, the
corporation has a minimal duty to educate its employees and its
failure to do so is less relevant. In examining the fifth factor,
the commission of the present offense, the factfinders should
examine the facts considered under the traditional respondeat
superior and MPC standards. Unlike these current standards
that look to these facts as the sine qua non in imposing liability,
however, the corporate ethos standard considers these facts to
be relevant, but not conclusive indicia, of corporate liability.
The factfinders should assess the sixth factor, how the corpora-
tion has reacted to past violations, to further evaluate whether
the corporation encourages or discourages illegal behavior.
Consideration of the last factor, compensation by the corpora-
tion, is extremely important because often a corporation's com-
pensation policies most directly influence its employees'
behavior. Assessing the message inherent in compensation is
complicated because most corporations use at least one form of
compensation, indemnification, in a way that encourages corpo-
rate crime, thus making most corporations criminally liable
under the corporate ethos standard. This Article suggests a dif-
ferent approach toward indemnification and insurance coverage
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of convicted executives: If corporations follow this approach,
the factfinder can more fairly weigh this component of a corpo-
ration's compensation package.
3. Criminal Conduct
The third element of the corporate ethos standard is
whether the ethos encourages criminal conduct. This element
is not as simple as it may appear; phrasing this element as "con-
duct that is determined to be criminal" may be more accurate.
The type of offense for which corporations are often prose-
cuted, white collar crime, necessitates this distinction.
It is apparent that burglary, homicide, and distributing co-
caine, for example, are criminal conduct. With white collar
crime, however, it is often not apparent that conduct is criminal
until after a jury and an appellate court have spoken.2 7 The
jurisprudence of white collar crime is replete with examples of
courts and legislatures struggling to clarify what is, or is not, a
crime. For example, in McNally v. United States,23 8 the
Supreme Court reversed a mail fraud conviction and held that
conduct that all of the federal appellate courts had considered
mail fraud for forty years,2 9 was not.20 Similarly, in Williams
v. United States,m the Supreme Court reversed a bank fraud
conviction; in so doing, the Court found the relevant conduct
was not bank fraud,m even though courts had for many years
held that such conduct constituted bank fraud. a3 In consider-
ing payments made between health care providers, the federal
courts of appeal have disagreed over the legality under kick-
back statutes of certain long-standing payment practices.2
The list could go on and on.
A criminal defendant may be aided in two ways when the
legality of the conduct at issue is not clear. First, a court may
agree that the conduct is not a crime and acquit the defendant
on that basis. Second, even if the court deems the conduct to be
237. A. REISs & A. BiDERmAN, DATA SOURCES ON WHrrE-COLLAR LAW
BREAKING 2 (1980).
238. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
239. I& at 362 n.1, 363-64 n.3, 365 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
240. Id at 361.
241. 458 U.S. 279 (1982).
242. Id at 284. Williams's conduct involved a check citing scheme. Id. at
279. The Court held that this conduct did not constitute a "'[f]alse statement
or report' in the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1014." Id
243. Id at 301 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
244. Bucy, supra note 95, at 915-16.
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criminal, the factfinders may decide that because the defendant
did not know the criminal nature of his act at the time he ac-
ted, he did not have the requisite intent to violate the law, and
thus acquit the defendant.
The corporate ethos standard of liability allows for this nu-
ance in white collar crimes. Although the facts may clearly
show the existence of a corporate ethos that encouraged certain
conduct ultimately found to be criminal, the factfinders may
appropriately acquit the corporate defendant (just as they may
acquit an individual defendant) if they believe it reasonable not
to have known that such conduct was criminal. This is one of
the ways the intent requirement introduces flexibility into cor-
porate criminal law. Given the ambiguity surrounding what
constitutes white collar crime, such flexibility seems especially
appropriate for defendants, whether individual or corporate,
charged with white collar crimes.
4. By Agents of the Corporation
Historically, before courts would hold a corporation liable,
they required that an agent of the corporation acting within the
scope of employment and with the intent to benefit the corpo-
ration perform the illegal activity.245 The corporate ethos stan-
dard of liability retains only the requirement that an agent of
the corporation perform the illegal activity.
Over the years, the "within the scope of employment" re-
quirement has evolved to mean "little more than that the act
occurred while the offending employee was carrying out a job
related activity."246 The cases where corporations were held li-
able even though the corporate employee acted in disregard of
specific instructions best demonstrate this minimal interpreta-
tion.247 Commentators who support this broad interpretation
argue that it is necessary, since otherwise every corporation
could avoid liability by issuing a directive from the board of di-
rectors prohibiting all illegal activity.248 The corporate ethos
standard does not disregard the requirement "within the scope
of employment;" rather, it is a rigorous application of this re-
245. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481,
494-95 (1909); Developments, supra note 3, at 1247.
246. Developments, supra note 3, at 1250.
247. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1000-07
(9th Cir. 1972); United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); United
States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342, 343-44 (3d Cir. 1948).
248. Developments, supra note 3, at 1250.
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quirement. If the ethos of the corporation encouraged the
agent to commit the illegal conduct, the agent's acts are within
her de facto authority. If the corporate ethos did not encourage
her acts, they are outside her authority.
Courts have also interpreted the element "for the benefit
of the corporation" almost out of existence. As one court
noted, "[t]here have been many cases ... in which the corpora-
tion is criminally liable even though no benefit [to the corpora-
tion] has been received in fact."249  Given current
interpretations, all this element now means is that courts can-
not hold a corporation liable for the illegal acts of its agents
when the corporation is the intended victim of the illegality.20
Standard Oil Co. v. United States51 provides an example. Vari-
ous individuals engaged in a scheme to pump more oil from
wells than Texas law allowed. Working with a third party, em-
ployees of a Standard subsidiary stole oil from Standard to fa-
cilitate the scheme. 252 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction of Standard and its
corporate subsidiary, finding that Standard was the victim of
the theft and did not realize a benefit from the illegality.2 3
Even if courts wanted to stringently impose this require-
ment, it is unclear how they could. It seems impossible to apply
literally. For example, if an employee takes bribes for favors to
corporate customers, has the corporation benefited? If so, how
do courts measure the benefit? Do the disadvantages, such as
poor relationships with other customers, a criminal conviction,
detrimental publicity, internal dissension, and poor morale, out-
weigh the benefit?
In conclusion, the corporate ethos standard explicitly re-
tains only the first portion of the traditional requirement that a
court can hold a corporation criminally liable only for the con-
duct of an agent acting within the scope of employment and
with the intent to benefit the corporation, namely, that an
agent of the corporation perform the criminal act. A corpora-
tion should not be liable for every person in the world who
might stumble in and use corporate resources to commit a
crime. The corporate ethos test does not explicitly include the
requirement "within the scope of employment" because simply
249. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962).
250. K. BRICKEY, supra note 2, § 4.02.
251. 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962).
252. Id at 123-24.
253. Id- at 128-29.
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applying the corporate ethos standard will include this proof.
Nor does the corporate ethos standard explicitly require proof
that the agent at issue was acting "for the benefit of the corpo-
ration." Historically, this requirement has been read into non-
existence with one caveat: Corporate liability cannot result
when the corporation itself is the victim of the illegality. This
seems to be such an obvious caveat for corporate liability that it
needs no emphasizing and certainly does not warrant the cur-
rently broad overstatement. Moreover, it is not clear how
courts could reasonably apply a "benefit" element. For all of
these reasons, the third element of the corporate ethos stan-
dard is simply that an agent of the corporation perform the
criminal act.
B. A COMPARISON OF THE CORPORATE ETHOS STANDARD TO
STANDARDS CURRENTLY USED TO IMPOSE CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LLBILTY
As noted, both the traditional respondeat superior standard
and, in a more limited sense, the MPC standard impute an indi-
vidual's intent to a corporation. The corporate ethos standard,
like both of these tests, looks to the criminal act and to the cor-
responding intent of individual corporate agents. It does not,
however, simply transfer this intent to an entity; rather, the
corporate ethos standard looks beyond the corporate agent's in-
tent to all aspects of the corporation that could have en-
couraged the criminal act. This corporate ethos analysis will
result in both more, and less, convictions than the current stan-
dards, depending on the category of the case. For purposes of
this comparison, corporate criminal liability cases can be
grouped into five categories: (1) cases where the corporation is
closely held; (2) cases where higher echelon corporate agents
commit the criminal act; (3) cases where lower echelon corpo-
rate agents commit the criminal act; (4) cases where corporate
agents commit the criminal act in contravention of corporate
policy or express instructions; and (5) cases where the court
cannot identify the corporate agent who commits the criminal
act.
Courts will almost certainly convict closely held corpora-
tions2M under the traditional respondeat superior test, the MPC
254. O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations, 23 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 341 n.1 (1958). O'Neal writes:
The term "close corporation" has been defined in various ways - as a
corporation with a relatively small number of shareholders, as a cor-
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test, and the corporate ethos test. Applying all of these tests to
this category is straightforward. Under the traditional respon-
deat superior standard, corporate liability will result if the gov-
ernment proves criminal intent on the part of any individual
who acts for the corporation. Under the MPC standard, corpo-
rate liability will result because so few individuals are associ-
ated with a closely held corporation that any one of them likely
constitutes a higher echelon official. Under the corporate ethos
test, liability will also result: When the corporation is synony-
mous with one or a few individuals, its ethos is also synony-
mous with the criminal intent of those individuals.
With closely held corporations, the real question is not
under what test a court should convict a corporation, but why.
Because criminal liability of the individual owner(s) is present
in virtually every instance, conviction of the corporate shell is
generally superfluous. Unlike the large corporate entity that
could continue to encourage new generations of executives to
commit criminal acts, the closely held corporation generally has
no identity apart from the convicted individual. Thus, follow-
ing conviction of this individual, the government gains no fur-
ther deterrence by convicting the corporation. Moreover, given
the availability of statutes like RICO,2 the government need
not include the corporation as a defendant to enhance the for-
feitable assets.
poration in which ownership and management are substantially iden-
tical, and as a corporation whose shares are not traded on an
exchange or an over-the-counter market. One-[person] companies and
family corporations are examples of close corporations, but many
close corporations are not owned by one person or a single family.
Id,
255. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963, any inter-
est acquired in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 is subject to criminal forfeiture and
"[a]ll right, title and interest in [such] property ... vests in the United States
upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture." Id. § 1963(c). Prop-
erty is acquired in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 and thus subject to forfeiture if
any person uses or invests any income acquired from a "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity" in an "enterprise," id. § 1962(a), if any person acquiring or main-
taining any interest in or control of an "enterprise" through a "pattern of
racketeering activity," id. § 1962(b), if any person employed by or associated
with an enterprise to conduct or participate in the conduct of an "enterprises"
affairs through a "pattern of racketeering activity," id. § 1962(c), or, if any per-
son conspires to do any of the above, id. § 1962(d). Because both the "person"
capable of committing this offense and the "enterprise" can be corporations,
id. § 1961(3)-(4), corporate assets may be subject to forfeiture for violations of
this statute if the assets were otherwise acquired or maintained in violation of
any provision of § 1962, even if the corporation is never charged or convicted
of a crime. See, eg., United States v. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186, 1195 (10th Cir. 1982),
cert denied, 464 U.S. 828 (1983).
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Under all three standards courts are also likely to convict
corporations whose higher echelon corporate agents commit the
criminal conduct. The facts of United States v. Empire Packing
Co.256 aptly demonstrate this outcome. Empire Packing's presi-
dent, Samuel Chapman, filed false claims regarding the number
of cattle slaughtered in order to receive improper government
subsidies.257 Applying traditional respondeat superior to these
facts is, as always, straightforward: If the government proves
Chapman had criminal intent, it has proven Empire's liability.
Empire is also liable under the MPC standard because Chap-
man, who directed the illegal activity, is clearly a high manage-
rial agent and thus a court will impute his criminal intent to
Empire. Lastly, Empire should, and would, be liable under the
corporate ethos test because Chapman apparently established a
pervasive corporate ethos that encouraged criminal conduct: he
was in charge of all plant operations and all buying, slaughter-
ing, and selling of cattle; he was the final authority in all corpo-
rate affairs; and he instructed other employees how to commit
the fraud and often did it himself.258
Riss & Co. v. United States,25 9 and Steere Tank Lines, Inc.
v. United States260 exemplify how the three tests would apply
in the third category of cases, where lower echelon corporate
agents perform the illegal conduct. Riss & Company (Riss), a
common carrier, employed drivers who exceeded the maximum
driving time set forth in Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) regulations.261 Willful violations constituted criminal of-
fenses.262 Because an investigation indisputably proved that
some of the drivers willfully violated this regulation, the court
affirmed the corporation's conviction, using the rationale of re-
spondeat superior.26 3 Whether the corporation also would be li-
able under the MPC standard is unclear. The terminal
256. 174 F.2d 16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1949).
257. Id. at 17-18.
258. Id. at 19.
259. 262 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1958).
260. 330 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1963).
261. Riss, 262 F.2d at 246.
262. The government prosecuted Riss under the following provision of the
Interstate Commerce Act: "Any person knowingly and willfully violating any
provision of this chapter, or any rule, regulation, requirement, or order there-
under, or any term or condition of any certificate, permit, or license, for which
a penalty is not otherwise herein provided, shall, upon conviction thereof, be
fined." 49 U.S.C. § 322(a), repealed by Interstate Commerce Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-473, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 1377, 1466.
263. Riss, 262 F.2d at 249-51.
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manager who supervised the drivers in question apparently
failed to watch their driving times carefully. If this manager
were deemed to be a high managerial agent, the corporation264
would be liable.
By contrast, the corporation probably would not be crimi-
nally liable under the corporate ethos test. No evidence sug-
gests that Riss knew its drivers exceeded the ICC regulations
on maximum driving times. On the contrary, Riss employed a
"Director of Safety and Personnel" to supervise the driving and
duty hours of all drivers. Riss also sent its drivers to seminars
on ICC regulations, conducted a continuing program of instruc-
tion in ICC and company regulations, operated its own safety
patrol cars that stopped drivers on the road to check their log
books, and operated under a "safety incentive award program"
whereby the company gave "bonus points" to drivers without
safety violations.26 The drivers' excess hours resulted from
one terminal supervisor's failure to adequately perform her du-
ties.26 6 Because Riss took steps to encourage compliance with
applicable regulations, it is hard to imagine that a corporate
ethos existed within Riss that encouraged its drivers to will-
fully violate ICC regulations. Thus, factfinders using the corpo-
rate ethos standard would likely find Riss & Company not
liable.
Steere Tank Lines (Steere), another motor carrier con-
victed for the same offense as Riss, provides an interesting con-
trast.26 7 Because the government was able to prove that a
Steere employee willfully violated the ICC regulation, the
court imputed the employee's willfulness to Steere using the
traditional respondeat superior standard, and thus convicted
Steere.268 Like Riss, Steere's liability under the MPC Standard
would depend on whether the government could show that spe-
cific high managerial agents authorized, or at least recklessly
tolerated, the ICC violations. Unlike Riss, however, Steere
would be liable under the corporate ethos test. In this case,
264. A "high managerial agent" includes any agent "having duties of such
responsibility that [her] conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy
of the corporation or association." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(4)(c) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962). Because of the log clerk's supervisory duties, Riss, 262
F.2d at 250, she could have been a high managerial agent within this definition.
265. Riss, 262 F.2d at 247.
266. HeL at 250.
267. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
268. Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 724 (5th Cir.
1963).
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there was evidence that the extra hours logged by Steere's driv-
ers were necessary to "handle the business on hand with the
available equipment and manpower"; 269 that at least one driver
was told to run extra hours "if he was to keep his job";- 0 and,
that the ICC had warned Steere repeatedly of this problem.2 1
Given the pervasiveness of this law-flouting mentality at
Steere, factfinders would likely determine that a corporate
ethos existed which encouraged the violations.
The cases where a corporate agent commits the criminal
acts in disregard of corporate policy or express instructions
most dramatically reveal the infirmities of the current stan-
dards of liability.272 In this fourth category, the corporation is
almost always liable under the traditional respondeat superior
test.27 3 Under the MPC standard, again liability would depend
on whether a high managerial agent commits or recklessly su-
pervises the offense. It is conceivable that this category of cases
often would result in liability under the MPC standard since a
high managerial agent usually is better placed than a lower
echelon employee to act in derogation of corporate policy: The
high managerial agent can better conceal lawless activity.
By contrast, under the corporate ethos test, liability almost
certainly would not attach to the corporation in this category of
cases. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.24 provides one of
the best examples. In Hilton, the company's purchasing agent
committed antitrust violations2 75 in disregard of corporate pol-
icy and contrary to express instructions.27 6 Despite the corpo-
269. Id at 719.
270. Id at 724.
271. Id
272. See supra text accompanying notes 27-31.
273. K. BRicKEY, supra note 2, § 3.07; Note, supra note 17, at 547-48.
274. 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972).
275. The court found that an antitrust violation occurred as follows: "Op-
erators of hotels [and other related businesses] organized an association to at-
tract conventions ... ." To help finance the association, "[c]ompanies selling
supplies to hotels were asked to contribute .... To aid collections, hotel mem-
bers . . . agreed to give preferential treatment to suppliers who paid their as-
sessments and to curtail purchases from those who did not." Id at 1002. The
government showed that the purchasing agent at the Portland, Oregon hotel
"threatened a supplier with loss of the hotel's business unless the supplier paid
the association assessment." Id at 1004.
276. The President of Hilton Hotels Corporation testified that corporate
policy prohibited "the manager of one of its hotels to condition purchases upon
payment of a contribution to a local association by the Supplier." Id. The
Portland hotel's manager and his assistant testified that "on two occasions
they told the hotel's purchasing agent that he was to take no part in the boy-
cott." Id
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ration's efforts to prevent such behavior, the district court
convicted the corporation under the traditional respondeat su-
perior standard.277 Although the MPC Standard was not used
in this particular case, criminal liability would result under it
for the Hilton Corporation if the purchasing agent is deemed to
be a high managerial agent.27s Liability, however, should not
result under the corporate ethos test. Not only was there no
ethos at Hilton that encouraged the purchasing agent's illegal
behavior, but there was specific testimony of an ethos discour-
aging such activity.279
United States v. Armour & Co.2s0 provides another compar-
ison of how the three standards of liability operate in a case
where the corporate agent commits the criminal act against cor-
porate policy or express instructions. Armour was convicted
for forcing customers into "tie-in" sales that violated the Emer-
gency Price Control Act of 1942 .281 "Tie-in" sales occur when a
customer is "force[d] ... to buy one product in order to obtain
another product .... ,28 2 The evidence showed that Armour, by
letters and personal meetings, specifically instructed its em-
ployees about price regulations and repeatedly cautioned them
against making tie-in sales. Nevertheless an Armour man-
ager, assistant manager, and one salesperson forced customers
into tie-in sales.284 Although Armour argued that it should not
be liable because its agents acted in disregard of specific in-
structions, the court found Armour guilty under the respondeat
superior standard.285 Armour would also be liable if the MPC
standard of corporate criminal liability is applied. Given the
277. Id
278. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(4)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see
supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
279. 467 F.2d at 1004.
280. 168 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948).
281. Ch. 26, § 1, 56 Stat. 23, repealed by Act of July 25, 1946, ch. 671, § 1, 60
Stat. 664.
282. Armour, 168 F.2d at 342.
283. Id- at 342-43.
284. I&
285. The Armour opinion uses language that suggests Armour was guilty
because it negligently failed in it "duty to be aware." Id- at 344. The relevant
statute in Armour, the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, required willful
intent, see Zimberg v. United States, 142 F.2d 132, 137 (1st Cir. 1944), thus the
court's finding of negligence was insufficient to prove an Emergency Price
Control Act violation. The court, however, found that the Armour employees
committed the criminal conduct "deliberately and with knowledge of the per-
tinent regulations." Armour, 168 F.2d at 343. By finding Armour guilty on
these facts, the court apparently imputed the employees' wilful conduct to Ar-
mour, thereby employing a respondeat superior standard of liability.
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position and duties of at least two of the individual defendants
(the branch manager of one office and the assistant branch
manager of another office), factfinders would likely find that
both individuals were "high managerial agents"28 6 and thus
that Armour is guilty.
Under the corporate ethos standard, however, no liability
would result for Armour. Armour's efforts to educate employ-
ees about the illegality of tie-in sales and its efforts to discour-
age such sales demonstrates not just the absence of an ethos
encouraging this illegal conduct, but that the prevailing ethos
actively discouraged such activity.
In the fifth category of cases, it is not possible to identify
the corporate agents responsible for the criminal conduct. Ac-
cordingly, corporate liability should not result under either the
traditional respondeat superior standard or under the MPC
standard because both standards depend on proving criminal in-
tent on the part of at least one corporate agent and imputing
that agent's criminal intent to the corporation to obtain a cor-
porate intent. When the court cannot identify an individual
with criminal intent, there is nothing to impute. The courts,
however, have circumvented this problem with the fiction of
collective knowledge,28 7 and held corporations liable.m
United States v. Sawyer Transport, Inc.289 illustrates the
use of this fiction. Although the evidence clearly showed that
Sawyer's drivers submitted false daily logs of the hours they
drove, the court found that no one employee at Sawyer pos-
sessed enough knowledge of the falsity to form a criminal in-
tent.290 Nevertheless, the court found that when combined, the
employees' bits of information were sufficient to constitute col-
lective intent and "wilfulness," which the court then imputed
to the corporation.291 Interestingly, the court also applied
something similar to the corporate ethos standard, noting that
"willfulness ... is established by proof that the [corporate] de-
fendant is plainly indifferent to the requirements of the statute
and regulations. '292
286. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
287. See, e.g., Inland Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F.2d 313, 315 (10th
Cir. 1951); United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 (W.D. Va.
1974).
288. See supra note 287.
289. 337 F. Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1971), affl'd, 463 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1972).
290. Id. at 31.
291. Id
292. Id at 30.
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The Sawyer result and its use of a collective intent fiction
reveals the inadequacy of corporate liability standards that de-
pend on an initial finding of individual intent. Corporate liabil-
ity should not attach when such standards are literally applied
because there is no individual agent's intent to impute to the
corporation. The fiction of collective intent, although perhaps
needed, is simply a desperate, but disingenuous, application of
the respondeat superior or MPC standards.
The corporate ethos standard remedies this problem for it
does not depend on a finding of individual intent, but rather al-
lows, as the Sawyer court attempted to do, an examination of
corporate actions that make corporate liability appropriate.
Thus, in the fifth category of cases, liability would attach under
the corporate ethos standard that would not attach under the
terms of either the respondeat superior or MPC standards.
In summary, the practical impact of the corporate ethos
test depends on which category of cases is at issue. Although
similar results would occur in some categories of cases regard-
less of the standard of liability used, this fact should not ob-
scure the significantly different process by which the
factfinders reach their results. Using respondeat superior to
prove and assess criminal liability of corporations essentially re-
quires only proof that the corporation employed the miscreant
actor. In this way, respondeat superior treats all corporations
as if they were alike, and holds them all responsible for their
agents, no matter what.293 Likewise, the MPC standard re-
quires only proof that a high managerial agent committed the
unlawful 'act, or supervised the miscreant agent.294 Although
the MPC thus narrows the broad swath of the traditional re-
spondeat superior standard, it still fails to sufficiently distin-
guish among corporations. Additionally, the MPC standard
discourages corporate executives from properly supervising
their subordinates. By comparison, the corporate ethos stan-
dard directs criminal liability toward only those corporations
which are "deserving" of prosecution as demonstrated by their
lawless ethos. In this way the corporate ethos standard re-
wards corporations that police themselves.
293. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
294. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(4)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see
supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
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C. A COMPARISON OF THE CORPORATE ETHOS STANDARD TO
OTHER PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LLABiLrrY
The corporate ethos standard relies heavily on the substan-
tial existing scholarship on corporate crime, especially the work
of Christopher Stone, John Coffee, John Braithwaite, Brent
Fisse, and Peter French. The corporate ethos standard builds
most clearly on these scholars' notion that internal controls are
the most effective way to achieve corporate responsibility.25
The corporate ethos standard, however, differs from these
scholars' proposals.
Christopher Stone has focused on building, within an or-
ganization, many of the internal systems discussed herein but
he advocates imposing them on corporations by law and prior to
any violation.296 For example, Stone recommends "impacting
corporate behavior directly, '297 by requiring corporations to ap-
point specific corporate officers whose duties are to represent
environmental or consumer interests, 298 and by requiring that
certain "categories of information" be brought to the attention
of the board of directors.29 Once the government establishes
these requirements, Stone suggests that failure to comply with
them should result in effective sanctions.30°
For years, John Coffee also has advocated use of these in-
ternal controls. He proposes that courts impose these controls
on corporations following conviction as conditions of proba-
tion.301 As Coffee acknowledges, however, his suggestions are
"dangerous" because "they interfere in unpredictable ways
295. See, e.g., Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 297-301 (1976) (testimony of
Christopher Stone) [hereinafter Hearings]; J. BRArmwArrE, supra note 11, at
143; C. STONE, supra note 133, at 35; Fisse, supra note 3, at 1221-46; cf. Coffee,
supra note 7, at 448 (supporting criminal sanctions against corporations as a
means for encouraging corporations to police themselves).
296. Hearings, supra note 295, at 297-301; C. STONE, supra note 133, at 35.
297. C. STONE, supra note 133, at 124.
298. Id
299. Id at 151.
300. Id. at 190.
301. Coffee, supra note 7, at 448-59. For example, Coffee proposes adopting
conditions of probation that require the corporation to "design and implement
new auditing and monitoring controls," id at 450, activating discipline within a
corporation (such as dismissal or demotion) for those employees "whose negli-
gence or indifference made possible the illegal conduct," i&i at 455, and "re-
aligning the manager's interests" through compensation schemes that reward
meeting safety goals, id at 456.
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with the dictates of efficiency."3 0 2 In addition, because an out-
sider, i.e. a court, imposes the internal controls as conditions of
probation, Coffee's proposal is intrusive - although not as in-
trusive as Stone's. Whereas Stone would require all corpora-
tions to implement the same internal controls, Coffee's
proposal applies only to corporations that by their criminal be-
havior demonstrate inadequate leadership.30 3 Further, Coffee's
proposal allows the court to tailor the internal controls to each
corporate defendant.304
The corporate ethos standard is not as intrusive as either
Stone's or Coffee's proposals. Under this standard, no entity
outside the corporation dictates that a corporation should insti-
tute internal procedures. Rather, the standard encourages cor-
porations to implement internal controls on their own since
doing so offers an opportunity to avoid criminal liability.30 5
The corporate ethos standard also allows corporations to choose
and design procedures best suited to them.3 0 6 The more effec-
tive the chosen procedures are, the better chance the corpora-
tion has of avoiding criminal liability if a corporate agent later
violates the law. Lastly, because the corporate ethos standard
addresses criminal liability in the first instance rather than af-
ter the criminal conduct has occurred,30 7 the internal controls
that this standard encourages are more likely to actually reduce
corporate crime.
In this last regard, the corporate ethos standard is similar
to sentencing guidelines the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion recently sent to Congress.3 08 Under this sentencing propo-
sal, the amount of fine levied against the convicted corporation
depends upon whether the corporate defendant utilized many
of the internal controls discussed herein.3 09 Thus, both the cor-
porate ethos standard and the United States Sentencing Com-
302. IML at 457.
303. Id. at 455.
304. Id-
305. See supra notes 192-210 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 135-51.
308. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 9, at 2001-24.
309. The Sentencing Commission's most recent proposed sentencing guide-
lines for organizations require the sentencing court to assess a convicted corpo-
ration's "culpability score," which helps to determine the amount of fine to
impose. Courts are directed to evaluate the involvement in or tolerance of
criminal activity by high-level personnel within the organization, the prior
criminal history of the organization, whether the organization obstructed or
impeded the investigation, and whether the organization had in place an "ef-
fective program to prevent and detect violations of the law." U.S. Sentencing
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mission's proposal, with the promise of more lenient treatment
from the criminal justice system, encourage corporations to vol-
untarily implement internal controls that will reduce corporate
crime. The sentencing proposal is commendable from this pub-
lic policy point of view. From a criminal justice point of view,
however, the Sentencing Commission's proposal comes too late
in the process to rectify the initial inappropriate use of the
criminal law. Under current standards of corporate liability, by
the time the Sentencing Commission's guidelines impact on a
corporation, the factfinders have already convicted the corpora-
tion without adequate evidence of corporate intent.
The corporate ethos standard is similar to John
Braithwaite's theory of "reintegrative shaming"31 0 because both
approaches promote corporate self-determination. Braithwaite
suggests that "[c]rime is best controlled when members of the
community are the primary controllers through active partici-
pation in shaming offenders, and... reintegrating the offender
back into the community of law abiding citizens." 31 ' This view
eschews formal punishment in favor of incentives for corporate
offenders to regulate themselves. Braithwaite explains: "Once
organizational reforms internalize this abhorrence [of crime],
then the self regulation of managerial consciences and organi-
zational ethics and compliance policies will do most of the work
for the government."31
Both reintegrative shaming and the corporate ethos stan-
dard of liability are mechanisms for encouraging corporations
to implement, on their own, prophylactic procedures that re-
duce the potential for criminal activity. Their focus, however,
differs. Reintegrative shaming is a sociological theory of crime
that "implies that solutions to the crime problem" are found in
a moral education of society, not in the criminal justice sys-
tem.3 1 3 In this sense, reintegrative shaming is a paradigm for
transforming society's propensity to break the law. By compar-
ison, the corporate ethos test addresses only the criminal justice
system and becomes relevant only when this system has to pick
up the pieces of society's failed moral education.
314
Comm'n, Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants, 49 Crim L.
Rep. (BNA) 2059, 2071 (May 8, 1991) (§ 8C2.5).
310. J. BRArrHWArrE, supra note 11, at 8.
311. Id.
312. Id- at 143.
313. Id. at 177-78.
314. Braithwaite's theory is optimistic, but not naive. He readily concedes
that "formal punishments are inevitable up to a point," id. at 179; he is simply
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Brent Fisse and Peter French have focused on the failure
of current standards of criminal liability to identify corporate
intent and have suggested a paradigm that identifies corporate
intent.315 The corporate ethos standard most clearly builds on
this paradigm when it directs factfinders to a corporation's re-
action to past violations.
Fisse and French suggest that we can ascertain a corporate
mens rea through the concept of "reactive corporate fault.
316
In a recent work, Fisse terms corporate mens rea "strategic
mens rea."317 As with the corporate ethos test, the government
bears the burden of proving strategic mens rea.3S1  Acknowl-
edging that such a mens rea would be "very difficult" to prove,
Fisse suggests allowing the corporate defendant a "reasonable
opportunity to formulate a legal compliance policy after the ac-
tus reus of an offense is brought to the attention of the poli-
cymaking officials. '319 In this way, the "corporation's fault can
be assessed on the basis of its present reactions [to the prior of-
fense] rather than its previously designed formal policy
directives." 320
Although this Article endorses Fisse and French's notion
that a corporation manifests its mens rea through its express or
implied policies, relying on reactive corporate fault seems inad-
equate for two reasons. First, reactive corporate fault automati-
cally gives a corporation a second chance. By definition,
reactive corporate fault depends on a corporation inappropri-
ately responding to the first violation. Waiting for the second
shoe to fall is too precarious given the potential harm that the
second "shoe" could cause. Fisse's response to this criticism is
three-fold: first, that most violations of the law are handled by
settlement; second, that civil remedies are available for the first
violation; and third, that he is not advocating use of reactive
corporate fault as the exclusive approach to corporate mens
rea, only when feasible.321 These responses beg the question.
When negotiations and civil remedies are inadequate responses
to the first violation, how can the government prove mens rea
urging that we should use the advantages of reintegrative shaming in our
punishments.
315. P. FRENCH, supra note 15, at 3147; Fisse, supra note 3, at 1195-1213.
316. Fisse, supra note 3, at 1190.
317. Id. at 1190-92.
318. See id. at 1191-92.
319. Id. (emphasis supplied).
320. Id. at 1210.
321. !d.
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for the first violation? Reactive corporate fault provides no an-
swer. The corporate ethos standard of liability attempts to do
SO.
The second, and more fundamental, problem with reactive
corporate fault is that it does not solve the jurisprudential di-
lemma of proving corporate mens rea for each actus reus. Cer-
tainly, a corporation's failure to respond appropriately to a first
violation smacks of evil intent for the second violation, but it
does not prove intent for the first violation. What if a corpora-
tion that admittedly responded inappropriately to a first viola-
tion experienced a turnover in management after its first
violation? To treat all actions regarding the two violations as
one continuous act would be wholly inappropriate, yet reactive
corporate fault apparently does so. Bootstrapping intent back-
wards to a previous violation inappropriately exploits the fic-
tion that intent is continuous. By contrast, the corporate ethos
test, while considering the corporate response to prior viola-
tions as one factor relevant in assessing corporate intent, still
requires proof of corporate intent at the time each offense
occurred.
Another conceptual approach toward corporate criminal li-
ability that respected scholars have advocated for years is a due
diligence defense. 322 A due diligence standard would allow a
corporation, otherwise criminally liable under respondeat supe-
rior, to "rebut [the] presumption of liability by proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that it, as an organization, exer-
cised due diligence to prevent the crime."32s Under the corpo-
322. See, e.g., Note, supra note 17, at 563 & n.73 (suggesting that the corpo-
ration should be allowed to "rebut a presumption of responsibility for all such
crimes by those in its employ by showing that the corporation in good faith did
everything within its power to prevent the commission of the offense").
The Model Penal Code recognizes a due diligence defense, but only for the
commission of violations or offenses outside the criminal code. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.07(5) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Ohio recognizes a due diligence
defense for all categories of corporate prosecutions unless "it plainly appears
inconsistent with the purpose of the section defining the offense." OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2901.23(c) (Anderson 1987). Other states also recognize a due dil-
igence defense, but only as to liability for minor infractions. See, e.g., ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 5-4(b) (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-311(2) (1985); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-7c (West 1982); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 307(d) (Purdon
1983); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.24 (Vernon 1974).
At least one federal court has recognized this defense. See, e.g., Holland
Ins. Co. v. United States, 158 F.2d 2, 8 (6th Cir. 1946) (holding that because no
corporate officer was "particeps criminis" with the wrongdoer, the corporation
should not be liable). Few federal courts have followed the Holland rationale.
Note, supra note 17, at 556-58.
323. Developments, supra note 3, at 1257 (citations omitted).
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rate ethos test, due diligence is a relevant issue,324 but the
burden of raising and proving such diligence differs from that
required if due diligence were an affirmative defense. Because
of this difference, the corporate ethos standard more consist-
ently and clearly provides a mechanism for finding corporate
intent than does the due diligence affirmative defense.
The following example may help demonstrate this differ-
ence. ABC, Inc. (ABC) is indicted along with Ed, one of its
many sales managers, for bribing a foreign government to ob-
tain relief from trade import quotas. Sam, CEO of ABC, heard
rumors of such bribes and, prior to Ed's action, announced at a
general sales meeting- "I have heard rumors about improper
actions by our sales managers to get the quotas down. Don't
anybody do anything that is going to get us in trouble." As-
sume that Sam was quite sincere in dissuading bribes when he
gave this admonition but was distracted by other pressing mat-
ters so his admonition was rather feeble.
If due diligence is an affirmative defense, ABC would pro-
duce, at trial, the above testimony by Sam and perhaps even
testimony from several witnesses who heard the announce-
ment, as evidence of due diligence. ABC's attorney would ar-
gue that, after all, Sam took the trouble of addressing the issue
at an important meeting with all significant players present.
After this testimony and argument, assume the government
successfully argues that Sam's vague and informal admonition
did not constitute a duly diligent effort to prevent the criminal
conduct. Agreeing with the government, the factfinders convict
ABC of violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).325
The government's ability to rebut a claim of due diligence,
however, does not mean that the government also can prove
that ABC encouraged the bribe. To prevail under the corporate
ethos test, the government would have to do more than rebut
ABC's evidence of due diligence. Rather, the government
would have to introduce evidence of an ethos within ABC that
encouraged Ed's illegal activity. The presence of such an ethos
could be shown by such practices as: pressure to generate an
unrealistic profit from sales to the foreign country given cur-
rent import quotas, tacit approval within ABC of prior bribes or
full indemnification of employees convicted of bribery in the
past. The government would have to prove this ethos beyond a
reasonable doubt.
324. See supra notes 153-236 and accompanying text.
325. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1988).
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The significant difference that results when the due dili-
gence defense is allowed, versus when the corporate ethos stan-
dard applies, is the demonstrated moral culpability of ABC.
With the due diligence defense, the government proves its case
simply by showing that the bribe occurred and by rebutting
ABC's claim of due diligence. ABC is convicted for the act of
one agent who was instructed (albeit not very effectively, but
instructed nevertheless) not to undertake the criminal conduct.
There is no evidence suggesting that anything or anyone in
ABC "caused" this criminal activity to occur. By contrast,
under the corporate ethos test, the government must prove, be-
yond a reasonable doubt, that a pervasive mentality existed
among ABC's employees that foreign bribery was an acceptable
way of doing business, and that this mentality, or ethos, en-
couraged Ed's criminal act.
Thus, although both the corporate ethos test and the due
diligence defense reward corporations that effectively police
themselves by absolving them of criminal liability for the crimi-
nal acts of their employees, the corporate ethos test goes fur-
ther than does the due diligence defense. By placing the
burden of proving encouragement of criminal conduct on the
government, the corporate ethos test forces the government to
prove the equivalent of a corporation's moral culpability before
the corporation can be convicted.
In conclusion, the corporate ethos standard is not as intru-
sive as Stone's proposal and, to a lesser extent, Coffee's propo-
sal. The corporate ethos standard impacts earlier in the
criminal justice system than do the proposals of Coffee and the
United States Sentencing Commission and, for that reason, it is
a more appropriate use of the criminal law. Also, because cor-
porate ethos is primarily an effort to use the criminal law ap-
propriately, it has a narrower focus than Braithwaite's theory
of reintegrative shaming, but a broader focus than Fisse and
French's theory of reactive corporate fault. Because the corpo-
rate ethos standard imposes a meaningful burden of proof on
the government rather than simply allowing corporations to
raise a defense of diligence, it ensures that criminal intent is
proven before a conviction can result, and thus more effectively
restricts criminal liability to its proper arena of intentional con-
duct. Because of these unique features, the corporate ethos
standard is preferable to these other proposals if we are going
to employ the criminal law to control corporate actors.
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III. PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS OF A CORPORATE
ETHOS STANDARD OF LIABILITY
If the corporate ethos standard is implemented, courts will
probably see an increase in the use of a defense strategy that
pits the corporate executive as target/defendant against the
corporation as target/defendant. As a result, there will be a
greater likelihood of a conflict of interest for counsel who rep-
resents both the corporation and the corporate executive. In
addition, there will be a greater need to protect the corpora-
tion's right to confront witnesses in trials where the corpora-
tion and corporate executive are co-defendants.
A. IMPACT ON DEFENSE STRATEGY
The defense that will become more viable under the corpo-
rate ethos standard of liability is unique to white collar crime.
To pursue this defense, a defendant admits that she voluntarily
engaged in the conduct at issue but asserts that she did not
know her conduct was unlawful and, therefore, did not have
the intent to violate the law.326 Evidence demonstrating that
other individuals similarly situated also engaged in such con-
duct is highly relevant and helpful to maintaining this defense.
For example, assume Ed of ABC, Inc. admitted that he made
payments to foreign officials, but claimed that he did so because
it was the expected, well-known, and widely-practiced custom
of salespersons in his business. With such an argument and ap-
propriate supporting evidence, Ed may convince a jury that
326. A longstanding maxim in criminal law is that ignorance of the law is
not an excuse for violating the law. See generally O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAw 47-48 (1881) (concluding that the purpose of the maxim is to deter delib-
erate ignorance of the law). The general rule also has exceptions. For exam-
ple, once a crime is deemed to have the element of specific intent, ignorance of
the law may be a defense. Thus, the jury instruction on specific intent often
given in federal courts is:
The crime charged in this case is a serious crime which requires
proof of specific intent before the defendant can be convicted. Spe-
cific intent, as the term implies, means more than the general intent
to commit the act. To establish specific intent the government must
prove that the defendant knowingly did an act which the law forbids,
[knowingly failed to do an act which the law requires] purposely in-
tending to violate the law. Such intent may be determined from all
the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.
An act or a failure to act is "knowingly" done, if done voluntarily
and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other in-
nocent reason.
E. DEvr & C. BLAcKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
§ 14.03 (1977).
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although he clearly engaged in prohibited conduct under the
FCPA, he did not knowingly and willfully break the law, but,
rather, thought that his behavior was appropriate and
customary.327
This defense would not be credible for a defendant charged
with a street crime. The house burglar who asserts that he
should not be criminally liable because everyone he knows
breaks into houses and steals VCRs, televisions, and stereos
would not fare well. With white collar crime, however, the line
between legitimate and illegitimate behavior, or civil and crimi-
nal transgressions, is unclear, overlapping, and often fluctuat-
ing.328 This fact, coupled with the complexity of many white
collar criminal transactions, makes it quite credible that an in-
dividual could engage in criminal conduct and never know of its
criminal nature.
A defense of compliance with prevailing customs and stan-
dards has always been possible when corporate employees are
targets or defendants.3- It can be difficult for corporate em-
ployees to pursue, however. Collecting the evidence to support
the defense can be problematic, using this defense may necessi-
tate that the corporate executive personally finance her legal
fees, and often, this defense is particularly emotionally draining
for the defendant who asserts it. The corporate ethos test, cou-
pled with the growth in D&O insurance, however, makes it eas-
ier for corporate executives to assert this defense.
The first, if not biggest, hurdle for the defendant who pur-
sues this defense is collecting sufficient evidence to convince
factfinders that the criminal conduct was part of customary and
prevailing standards of behavior. Although the executive may
have an intuitive feel for the customs and practices of his pro-
fession, translating this "intuitive feel" into persuasive, admissi-
ble evidence can be difficult and time-consuming. Successful
presentation of this defense requires documentation and testi-
mony by other employees that such practices exist, and that
these employees participated in them.
The corporate ethos standard of liability goes far toward
overcoming this first hurdle. To prevail against the corporate
327. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, § 104(g)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-2(g)(2)(b), as amended by Act of Aug. 23, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit.
V, § 5003(c), 102 Stat. 1419, provides penalties for corporate agents who "will-
fully violat[e]" the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 238-43.
329. See, e.g., United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 788 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 988 (1976).
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defendant under this standard of liability, the government must
prove the existence of a corporate ethos that encouraged the
criminal conduct. The government, therefore, must essentially
show the existence of customs and standards within the corpo-
ration. To meet this burden, the government will issue subpoe-
nas, litigate motions to quash filed in response to the
subpoenas, and obtain and analyze hundreds of documents in-
cluding many internal memoranda that may not be readily ac-
cessible to employees. The government will present witnesses
to a grand jury, where they are subject to perjury for false or
misleading testimony, and may offer leniency or even immu-
nity to some witnesses. A corporate executive can "piggy back"
this investigative effort and argue that she did not intend to
commit crimes, but was simply complying with the ethos that
the government has just proven.
A second hurdle in presenting this defense is financial:
Pursuing a defense antagonistic to the corporation may require
the corporate executive to sacrifice corporate payment of her
defense costs and obtain independent counsel. Because some
executives do not want to personally pay the attorney fees in-
curred in their defense, they would choose not to obtain in-
dependent counsel and thus would not pursue this defense even
when it was appropriate.
In recent years, however, D&O insurance has made this
hurdle less of a problem. When the corporation and its execu-
tives, as co-targets or co-defendants, share the same counsel,
the executives are understandably reluctant to pursue a de-
fense antagonistic to the corporation. When the corporation
and corporate executives have separate counsel, but the corpo-
ration is paying the defense costs for the employees, this reluc-
tance remains, although to a lesser extent. A corporate
executive's attorney, whose fees are being paid by the corpora-
tion, is well aware of who pays the bill and not oblivious to the
chance of future legal work from the corporation. If the corpo-
rate executive whom the attorney represents incriminates the
corporation, this attorney knows that her chances of future re-
tainer by the corporation are jeopardized.
D&O liability insurance, which has expanded tremen-
dously in the last decade,330 has altered this financial arrange-
ment. Although the corporation pays the insurance premiums,
the corporate executive covered by the insurance is allowed to
330. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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select his own counsel.331 Moreover, because the D&O insurer
covers liabilities incurred by the covered executive but not
those incurred by the corporation,332 the D&O insurer has a fi-
nancial incentive to pursue defenses that shift liability from the
executive to the corporation. Under the corporate ethos stan-
dard of liability, this shift more readily occurs once an execu-
tive attempts to exculpate herself by pointing to corporate
customs and practices.
The third hurdle for an executive in using the defense of
compliance with corporate custom is the emotional trauma it
may cause. A loyal corporate executive may find it wrenching
to pursue a defense that pits him against his employer. The
criminal justice system can never fully overcome this hurdle,
but the use of independent counsel and the chance of success
can ease this emotional hardship.
In short, the corporate ethos test, combined with the
growth of D&O insurance, makes it easier for the corporate ex-
ecutive to pursue a defense strategy antagonistic to his corpo-
rate employer. The emerging viability of this defense
exacerbates the potential for a conflict of interest on the part of
the attorney who represents both the executive and the corpo-
ration. If the corporate ethos standard of liability is imple-
mented, courts must be sensitive to its effect on this conflict of
interest problem.
331. Although the insurer may not have a duty to defend, it can still retain
some control over the choice of defense through counsel clauses "that forbid
the incurring of 'costs, charges, and expenses' without the company's consent."
Note, supra note 229, at 704. Such control could still be a problem if the in-
surer can exert control over the course of the case by encouraging settlement
when the director may prefer not to settle. Bishop, New Cure for an Old Ail-
ment: Insurance Against Directors & Officers Liability/Fiduciary Liability,
22 Bus. LAw 92, 106 (1966). The corporation may also encourage a finding that
excludes policy coverage because of dishonest behavior. See supra note 224
and accompanying text. Recognizing this conflict, some courts have held that
in a conflict of interest situation, "the insurer's obligation to defend extends to
paying the reasonable value of the legal services and costs performed by in-
dependent counsel selected by the insured." Previews, Inc. v. California Union
Ins. Co., 640 F.2d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 1981).
332. Note, supra note 229, at 692 (D&O policies "reimburse the corporation
only for indemnifying directors, not for any legal expenses it incurs in its own
defense" (emphasis in original)); see also id. at 700 (noting that a D&O policy
does not cover any claims or suits against the corporation itself, only indemni-
fication payments to directors"); Johnston, supra note 221, at 2013 ("It is im-
portant to understand that the Corporate Reimbursement form covers only
the corporation's obligation to indemnify its directors and officers. It does not
cover any liability which the corporation itself may have to the plaintiff in any
given action." (emphasis in original)).
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B. CONFLICT OF INTEREST
To fully discuss the effect of the corporate ethos standard
on the conflict of interest issue, it is necessary to briefly review
the pertinent law. Representation of conflicting interests,
whether at the grand jury investigative stage or at trial, can oc-
cur in the following ways: (1) representation of more than one
grand jury target or defendant;333 (2) representation of the tar-
get or defendant while simultaneously representing a non-tar-
get or non-defendant witness; 3 (3) representation of multiple
witnesses and some tie to the target/defendant, as when the
target/defendant pays for the representation.- In analyzing
each of these situations, courts seek to determine whether a
conflict of sufficient magnitude exists that requires disqualify-
ing counsel from representing at least some of her clients.-
Conflict of interest analysis begins with the sixth amend-
ment's guarantee that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have assistance of counsel for his
defense."m This right to counsel includes the right to "effec-
tive" assistance of counsel,ass which encompasses representa-
tion free from conflicting interests.M Because the sixth
amendment's right to counsel also includes counsel of one's
choice,3 40 the question in conflict of interest cases becomes one
of waiver, namely, whether the client disadvantaged by the ac-
tual or potential conflict of interest may waive the right to con-
flict-free counsel and continue with counsel of choice.1 -1
333. See, e.g., Bernstein, 533 F.2d 788-89; United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d
965, 973 (8th Cir.) (on remand disqualification ordered, United States v.
Agosto, 538 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Minn. 1982)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 934 (1982).
334. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 436 F. Supp. 818, 821 (W.D.
Pa. 1977); Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa 511, 526-29, 341 A. 2d 896, 903-04 (1975), cert
denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
335. See, e.g., United States v. R.M.I. Co., 467 F. Supp. 915, 921 (W.D. Pa.
1979). But see In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600,
608 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (union paid one attorney to represent 21 union members
subpoenaed as witnesses; held not to be a conflict necessitating
disqualification).
336. See supra cases cited in notes 333-35.
337. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
338. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
339. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485-86 (1978).
340. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir. 1978), cer,
denied, 439 U.S. 1075 (1979).
341. See, e.g., United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969-70 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 934 (1982); In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1186 (2d Cir. 1977); In
re Grand Jury, 446 F. Supp. 1132, 1139 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (and cases cited
therein). The MoDEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT 1.7, 1.8 & 1.13 (Dis-
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The courts generally agree that when counsel represents
co-defendants pursuing antagonistic defenses, a conflict of in-
terest that violates a defendant's sixth amendment right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel is present,-42 and such a conflict
necessitates a new trial absent a waiver of the conflict of inter-
est problem. To avoid reversal, courts try to prevent such a
conflict from occurring by seeking an effective waiver or by dis-
qualifying counsel from representing one or some of her cli-
ents. The courts are not consistent in how they approach this
situation, however. They disagree over what constitutes a con-
flict of interest; whether a particular situation presents an ac-
tual or potential conflict of interest; and over the circumstances
under which a client may waive a conflict of interest.343 Some
courts have disqualified counsel in cases presenting only "po-
tential" conflicts of interests, even when the client has waived
his right to conflict-free counsel.3" Other courts appear to re-
quire the existence of an actual conflict of interest before or-
dering disqualification.345 Most courts have held that the client
cannot waive an actual conflict of interest,m although dicta in
a few cases has indicated that the client may even waive actual
conflicts of interest.3 7
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,
gave some guidance to the lower federal appellate courts'
cussion Draft 1983) provide some guidance for attorneys in this situation, but
no clear answers.
342. See, e.g., United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 788 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 988 (1976).
343. See Moore, Disqualifcation of an Attorney Representing Multiple
Witnesses Before a Grand Jury: Legal Ethics and the Stonewall Defense, 27
UCLA L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1979) (discussing fully this inconsistency).
344. In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 267 n.6 (5th Cir. 1976); Pirllo v. Takiff, 462
Pa. 511, 517-18, 341 A.2d 896, 899, 906 (1975).
345. Grand Jury, 446 F. Supp. at 1140 (court refused to grant government's
motion to disqualify attorney representing grand jury witnesses on the ground
only a potential, not an actual, conflict of interest was shown to exist in coun-
sel's representation); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 436 F. Supp. 818, 823
(W.D. Pa. 1977) (court indicates motion for disqualification is not ripe until
there is an actual conflict of interest).
346. United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1184 (3d Cir. 1978); Grand Jury
Investigation, 436 F. Supp. at 822 (court holds that waiver of actual conflict ex-
isting in this case would be "purely illusory").
347. See United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591, 592 (2d Cir.
1975); United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1975); cf In re Taylor,
567 F.2d 1183, 1186 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that "each suspect or accused may
knowingly and intelligently waive any claims which might arise from coun-
sel's conflict of interest" (emphasis supplied)).
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murky treatment of this issue.- Noting that "the Courts of
Appeals have expressed substantial disagreement about when a
district court may override a defendant's waiver of his attor-
ney's conflict of interest," 9 the Court held that district courts
have broad discretion to disqualify attorneys in cases of actual
conflict, as well as in cases where there is "a showing of a seri-
ous potential for conflict."-''  Although the Court recognized a
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel of choice, it held
that "the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an
effective advocate for each criminal defendant."'31 For this rea-
son, a court can disqualify counsel, even when all interested
parties waive any future claims of a conflict of interest.352
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has specifically discussed
the special problems presented by counsel's joint representa-
tion of an organization and individuals within the organization.
In Wood v. Georgia,-35 the Court recognized the "inherent dan-
gers that arise when a criminal defendant is represented by a
lawyer hired and paid for by a third party."'  One risk the
Court noted in this fee relationship is that the lawyer may
"prevent his client from... offering testimony against his ...
employer or from taking actions contrary to the employer's in-
terest."-155 This risk could become common if courts adopt the
corporate ethos standard of liability, because under this stan-
dard the employee who argues that he was merely conforming
to prevailing custom and standards will be offering evidence
against his employer.
In short, a criminal system that uses the corporate ethos
standard of liability and is populated by attorneys reimbursed
by D&O insurance poses a high risk that a conflict will arise for
counsel who jointly represents a corporation and its executives.
The advent of D&O insurance has weakened the economic web
348. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
349. Id. at 158.
350. Id. at 164.
351. Id at 159.
352. IE at 159-60.
353. 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
354. Id at 268-69.
355. Id at 269. Several courts have recognized the pressure placed on em-
ployees jointly represented with their employers. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 436 F. Supp. 818, 821 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (holding that an attorney
may not represent a target corporation and its employees, who appear as wit-
nesses); In re Abrams, 56 N.J. 271, 276, 266 A.2d 275, 278 (1970) (holding that
an attorney may not represent both a corporation and its employee when it is
in the employee's self-interest to disclose a corporation's criminal conduct).
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that historically bound the corporation and the corporate exec-
utive together in pursuit of a joint defense. 6 Adoption of the
corporate ethos standard of liability, and the bootstrap it pro-
vides to the corporate executive who wishes to pursue a defense
resulting in harm to his corporate employer, will further erode
this bond. The Supreme Court's current approach to the con-
flict of interest problem - that courts may order disqualifica-
tion in cases of actual or potential conflicts of interest, even
with waivers by the parties - need not change.3 7 Although
the corporate ethos standard of liability and D&O insurance
present an increased danger of a conflict of interest, adopting a
per se rule against joint representation of a corporate defendant
and corporate employees who are co-defendants is not wise or
appropriate. Significant and legitimate advantages to joint rep-
resentation exist when the potential for antagonistic defenses
is not present: the client may suffer delay, inconvenience, and
expense if forced, unnecessarily, to obtain separate counsel;
new counsel may be unable to reconstruct evidence that prior
counsel assembled; and the pooling of the memories of several
clients may elucidate nuances a single memory cannot.m
Rather, if a corporate ethos standard of liability is adopted,
courts should incorporate a greater sensitivity to the changing
topography of defense strategies when they analyze criminal
cases where a corporation and a corporate executive are co-
defendants.
C. CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES
Another concern arises if executives become more willing,
for whatever reason, to pursue a defense that exculpates them
at the expense of their corporate employer. Corporate execu-
tives may make unfounded claims that there existed a corpo-
rate ethos that encouraged their conduct and overcame their
ability to see that their conduct was criminal. To guard against
such claims, the courts must be vigilant in protecting another
sixth amendment right - the right to confrontation of
witnesses.
Assume that the FBI investigates ABC, Inc. and several of
its employees for fraud. Early in the investigation, FBI agents
interview employee X, who freely admits that he engaged in
356. See supra notes 220-34 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 344-48 and accompanying text.
358. See Developments in the Law - Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Pro-
fession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1380, 1380-84 (1981).
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the conduct for which he and ABC are later indicted. In this
interview, X explains that "everyone" in ABC knows of, and is
expected to assist in, the conduct in question. Once trial com-
mences, X declines to take the stand. The court, however, al-
lows one of the FBI agents who interviewed X to testify about
X's earlier statement as a party admission.359 X's statement
does not affect ABC's criminal liability under the traditional re-
spondeat superior test, because the existence of an ethos that
encouraged X's action is irrelevant to ABC's liability.36 0 X's
statement may affect ABC's liability under the MPC test if the
statement demonstrates that a high managerial agent within
ABC directed, performed, or recklessly tolerated the criminal
conduct.361 If the corporate ethos standard applies, however,
X's statement is powerful and incriminating evidence of ABC's
criminal liability.36 2 Although X's testimony incriminates
ABC, ABC will never get the opportunity to confront or cross-
examine X since X does not take the stand.
In 1968, the Supreme Court recognized this confrontation
problem when it reversed George Williams Bruton's conviction
for armed postal robbery.363 Federal agents had interviewed
Bruton's co-defendant, Evans, during the investigation of the
robbery. Evans orally confessed that he and Bruton committed
the robbery.36 At trial, Evans did not take the stand; one of
the agents who earlier interviewed him, however, testified
about Evans' statement, thus inculpating both Evans and
Bruton.365 Because Evans did not take the stand, Bruton had
no opportunity to cross-examine him.36 6 The Court held that
this prejudiced Bruton's sixth amendment right to confronta-
tion of witnesses and constituted reversible error. Moreover,
the Court held that instructing the jury to disregard as inad-
missible hearsay Evans' statement about Bruton's conduct
could not cure the error.367
Bruton, however, has never been an absolute rule. The
Supreme Court recognized that "not every admission of inad-
missible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be re-
359. See FED. R. EvD. 801(d)(2)(A).
360. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 254-94 and accompanying text.
363. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
364. I& at 124.
365. I-
366. See id at 137.
367. I&
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versible error unavoidable through limiting instructions."36 In
analyzing the seriousness of a Bruton problem, courts have con-
sidered the reliability6 9 and the signficance37 0 of the testimony
at issue. Courts will not admit such testimony, even if reliable,
if it is devastating to the defendant.3 7 1 To avoid Bruton rever-
sals, the proponent of a statement by one defendant inculpating
a co-defendant will generally "Brutonize" the statement, delet-
ing all references to the co-defendant prior to seeking admis-
sion of the statement.
This method of analyzing the right to confrontation need
not change if courts implement the corporate ethos standard. It
is important to recognize, however, that statements once irrele-
vant to a corporate defendant's liability will become powerfully
incriminating evidence against the corporate defendant under a
corporate ethos standard. Further, once it becomes more ad-
vantageous for corporate executives to pursue a defense antago-
nistic to their corporate employers, corporate executives will
have an incentive to exculpate themselves by fabricating testi-
mony that incriminates their corporate employers. Thus, a
greater need for confrontation and cross-examination arises if
the corporate ethos standard of liability is implemented.
For example, Judge Friendly's approach in United States v.
Southland Corp.372 would be inappropriate if the court were ap-
plying the corporate ethos standard of liability. Southland, a
large retailer, and an attorney were convicted on conspiracy to
commit bribery charges. During trial, the government intro-
duced notes of Southland's general counsel as evidence that at-
torney fees paid and deducted as a business expense were in
fact bribes.3 7 3 The general counsel invoked his fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination and thus was unavailable
368. Id- at 135.
369. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980); Marcusi v. Stubbs, 408
U.S. 204, 213 (1972); Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136.
370. Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 191 (1987) (citing Parker v. Randolph,
442 U.S. 62, 75 (1979)); Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136.
371. Cruz, 481 U.S. at 191-92. The Cruz Court reversed Cruz's conviction
because the trial court admitted the confession of Cruz's co-defendant impli-
cating them both, even though the trial court also admitted Cruz's own confes-
sion. Noting that the co-defendant's confession "corroborate[d] the defendant's
confession," the Court held that the problem was not reliability, id. at 192, but
the statement's "devastating" impact, particularly because Cruz now claimed
that he had never confessed, id. But see Parker, 442 U.S. at 74 (holding that
possible prejudice from the jury failing to follow limiting instructions of trial
court is not so "devastating" as to require exclusion of evidence).
372. 760 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 825 (1985).
373. Id at 1375.
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as a witness.374 Southland argued that admitting the general
counsel's notes violated its sixth amendment confrontation
rights s75 Judge Friendly rejected Southland's argument, not-
ing that it "seems hardly appropriate when voiced by Southland
since the witness it wishes to confront is, in the eyes of the law,
itself."3 76 In the Southland case, such reasoning made sense,
because by incriminating the general counsel, the statement at
issue also incriminated Southland. Thus, it was accurate to
view the corporation and its employee as one. With the corpo-
rate ethos test, however, there is a greater likelihood that the
interests of the corporation and the corporate executive will be
antagonistic. When this is the case, denying a corporation the
right to confront its employee on the ground that the corpora-
tion and corporate employee share a common identity will be
unjust.
In summary, both the corporate ethos standard of liability
and the increase in D&O insurance supply incentives for an ac-
cused corporate executive to claim that, because she was acting
in conformity with corporate customs and practices, she lacked
knowledge of her illegality and thus had no intent to violate
the law. Under current standards of liability, such a defense
does not inculpate the corporate employer. Under the corpo-
rate ethos standard of liability, it does. D&O insurance adds
further incentive for the executive to attempt to shift liability
to the corporation. Although D&O insurance covers a corpo-
rate executive's liability, it does not cover the corporation's lia-
bility. Thus, by shifting liability from the executive to the
corporation, the D&O insurer benefits.
In some cases, the pursuit of a defense that one was una-
ware of the criminal nature of his acts because of an overpow-
ering corporate ethos will be well founded and appropriately
freed by changing standards of liability and methods of reim-
bursement. In other cases, the executive's use of this defense
will be purely opportunistic and unfounded. In either case,
however, greater use of this defense increases the danger of
conflict in the joint representation of a corporate executive and
her corporate employer and necessitates stringent protection of
the corporate defendant's need to confront witnesses.
374. I&
375. Id-
376. Id at 1377 (citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281
(1943)).
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IV. A RESPONSE TO CRITICS
The corporate ethos standard, like most new proposals for
change, will likely draw criticism. This section addresses this
potential criticism and explains how these supposed weaknesses
are, in some respects, actually strengths. In other respects, the
criminal justice system will need to recognize the ramifications
of adopting the corporate ethos standard and adjust
accordingly.
One likely criticism of the corporate ethos test is that it is
not workable. It is, theoretically and practically. Several
analogous legal standards that demonstrate courts' effective use
of the organizational liability concept already exist.
One analogy is the Pinkerton Rule in conspiracy law.
Daniel and Walter Pinkerton were moonshiners in rural Ala-
bama in the 1940s.37 7 When Daniel was incarcerated for previ-
ous offenses, his brother continued to make the contraband
whiskey and failed to pay the applicable taxes.378 Both Daniel
and Walter were thereafter indicted and convicted on conspir-
acy and tax evasion charges.379 Both were convicted on the
conspiracy charge. Walter was convicted on the substantive tax
evasion charges. To Daniel's surprise, so was he even though
the alleged tax evasion occurred while Daniel was in jail.380 On
appeal, Daniel argued that he should not be liable for the sub-
stantive violations of the tax laws when he clearly could not
have committed or even participated in them.381 The Supreme
Court disagreed. It held that because of Daniel's own act of
joining the conspiracy and failing to disavow his association
with the conspiracy, he became vicariously liable for all sub-
stantive offenses that other co-conspirators committed in fur-
therance of the conspiracy. 382
Similarly, by a corporation's own act of creating and con-
tinuing an ethos that encourages criminal conduct, it becomes
liable for the criminal offenses committed by its agents. The
corporate ethos standard still employs, of course, vicarious lia-
bility since it holds the corporate defendant liable for the acts
of others. It is, however, a more fine-tuned form of vicarious
377. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 641 (1946).
378. Pinkerton v. United States, 151 F.2d 499, 500 (5th Cir. 1945), aff'd, 328
U.S. 640 (1946).
379. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 641.
380. Pinkerton, 151 F.2d at 500.
381. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 645-46.
382. Id at 646.
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liability than the traditional respondeat superior or IPC stan-
dards because it alone provides a mechanism for focusing crimi-
nal liability only on those corporations that manifest an intent
to violate the law.3s 3
Another analogy can be found in municipal liability under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides that persons, including fic-
tional persons, who deprive citizens of certain rights are liable
to the injured person.384 In Monell v. New York City Depart-
ment of Social Services,38 5 the Supreme Court held that this
section clearly envisions liability of municipal corporations
"only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional vi-
olation at issue."' s 6 Section 1983 does not utilize traditional re-
spondeat theory, whereby a municipality can be found liable for
an employee's isolated act.38 7 Rather, like the corporate ethos
standard for corporate criminal liability, it provides a "fault-
based analysis for imposing... liability."s3 It does so by focus-
ing on the municipal "custom" or "policy 38 9 that is the "mov-
ing force" 3 0 of the constitutional deprivation, and imposes
liability only if the evidence shows that "some official policy
'causes' an employee to violate another's constitutional
rights. '391 Since the Monell decision in 1978, therefore, courts
and juries have worked with and applied the notion that a fic-
tional entity can devise a policy that makes it responsible for
illegal acts by its employees.392
383. See supra notes 252-88 and accompanying text.
384. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person [including fictional persons] who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage... subjects or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
385. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
386. City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (1989) (citing Monell, 436
U.S. at 694-95) (emphasis in original). The Monell Court overruled Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), and held that "persons" within Section 1983 includes
municipal corporations. 436 U.S. at 690, 701.
387. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 ("In particular we conclude that a municipality
cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor - or, in other
words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat supe-
rior theory." (emphasis in original)).
388. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818 (1985).
389. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
390. I& at 694.
391. Id at 692.
392. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (1989); City of
Springfield v. Kibble, 480 U.S. 257, 267 (1987). It should be noted that
although this line of cases, like the corporate ethos standard of liability, re-
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Presumably, commentators will direct the major thrust of
their workability criticism at the "ethos" element - namely,
that it is not possible to fully, completely, and accurately ascer-
tain a corporate ethos. This is true; it is not possible. But who
are we fooling? The criminal law has long imposed a factually
impossible burden on the government with its requirement of
mens rea. We are accustomed to this burden, however, and so
do not easily realize that, truly, direct proof of intent is impossi-
ble and we have simply become comfortable with approxima-
tions that do not overcome the impossibility of our task.
Assume X has been indicted on mail fraud charges for devising
a scheme to defraud investors. X's consistent defense is that he
never intended to defraud anyone, but his good plans, like
many business ventures, simply went awry. Y is indicted for
murder. Her consistent defense is that she did not purposely
kill the victim; it was an accident. The government will present
circumstantial evidence from which factfinders can attempt to
infer these defendants' true mental states. In both instances,
however, no one - not the grand jury, prosecutor, petit jury, or
judge - will ever know what was in X or Y's minds. However,
our inability to directly prove intent does not cause us to reject
the entire concept, or given sufficient circumstantial evidence,
to question whether the factfinders have accurately deduced a
person's intent. So it is with corporate ethos. When the gov-
ernment presents sufficient circumstantial evidence, we can
flects the view that fictional entities are capable of promulgating a policy or
custom for which the entity itself should be held liable, they do not clearly re-
flect a mechanism for determining what this policy or custom is.
The Monell Court states that "formal approval through the body's official
decision making channels" is not required before finding the existence of a
policy subjecting a municipality to § 1983 liability. 436 U.S. at 690-91. In later
cases, however, the Court appears to be doing just that. In Tuttle, the Court
held that an isolated incident by a single low-level officer was insufficient to
subject the municipality to liability. 471 U.S. at 833. In Pembaur v. Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469 (1986), the Court held that the four-word response by a single
county employee (a county prosecutor) was sufficient to constitute county pol-
icy. Id. at 484. The Court's discussions in both cases focused on formal aspects
of the decision-making process surrounding both of the alleged municipal poli-
cies. In Tuttle, the Court emphasized the lack of involvement by official
policymakers. 471 U.S. at 831-33. In Pembaur, the Court emphasized the pros-
ecutor's authority as described in state statutes. 475 U.S. at 484-85.
By contrast, the corporate ethos standard focuses on many aspects of a
corporation's structure in seeking to identify the corporate ethos, custom or
policy. The formal decision making process and the status of participants in-
volved in the activity are but two relevant factors. See supra notes 252-88 and
accompanying text.
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and should feel confident in the factfinders' deduction of a cor-
poration's ethos.
Another criticism of the corporate ethos test may be that
the government will invade corporate privacy in its search to
gather evidence of a corporate ethos that encourages unlawful
behavior. In fact, the corporate ethos test would not encourage
this invasion of corporate privacy any more than do current
standards of liability. In virtually every criminal investigation
of corporate misdeeds, the government also investigates the po-
tential criminal liability of corporate officers. To fully investi-
gate this potential individual liability, agents, prosecutors, and
the grand jury must delve into the inner machinations of the
corporation.393 Moreover, even when corporate criminal liabil-
ity (and not individual criminal liability) is the issue and due
diligence is allowed as an affirmative defense, the government
should fully investigate the inner workings of the corporation
for two reasons. The first is to determine if the corporation is
indictable. If the corporation will have a strong due diligence
defense, 394 it may well be inappropriate for the grand jury to
return an indictment. Second, assuming the government will
be able to indict the corporation, it will use the investigative re-
sources of the grand jury to gather evidence to overcome any
due diligence defense. Thus, criminal investigations of corpo-
rate targets have been as broad under current standards as they
would be under the corporate ethos test.
A third criticism of the corporate ethos standard may be
that using this test will result in fewer criminal prosecutions of
corporate defendants. This criticism is probably true, and may
appear to be a weakness to those who favor relentless pursuit
of miscreant corporations. Upon full reflection, however, critics
should see this fact not as a weakness, but as a strength of the
standard. Criminal prosecution is only part of the arsenal
393. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-11.110 (1988). In holding that a cor-
poration may not assert a fifth amendment privilege when served with a grand
jury subpoena for corporate records, the Hale Court noted the reason for the
grand jury's broad powers to investigate corporations: "[Tihe corporation is a
creature of the state.... It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state,
having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not, in
the exercise of its sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been em-
ployed, and whether they had been abused." 201 U.S. at 74-75.
394. The due diligence defense complicates the inquiry into corporate crim-
inal liability and becomes more like the inquiry under the corporate ethos
standard. Although popular with scholars, courts have rarely allowed this
defense.
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available to combat corporate misbehavior. Specialized agencies
exist to monitor and regulate corporations.3 95 An honest ap-
praisal of the limited role that the criminal law should play in
regulating corporate misbehavior could help channel additional
resources to these agencies. Beyond this, the crucial point of
the corporate ethos test is that it will target only the morally
culpable corporation for criminal prosecution. Thus, the corpo-
rations indicted will be the "bad" corporations that have
demonstrated an intent to violate the law. As such, the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion will be more consistent, the
sentences rendered will be harsher, and greater deterrence of
unlawful behavior will result.
A fourth criticism of the corporate ethos standard - that
courts will find it more difficult to administer than current
standards of liability - is both a weakness and a strength. In
part, the difficulty will stem from unfamiliarity with a new
standard of liability. Such difficulty also will stem from the
fact that the corporate ethos standard is more fact-sensitive
than are the current standards of liability. Assessing the many
facets of a corporation's ethos to determine whether it en-
couraged the particular criminal conduct at issue is a compli-
cated task. Certainly, this inquiry is more complex than simply
assessing whether a corporate agent committed the conduct
(the traditional respondeat superior test), or whether a high
managerial agent performed, authorized, or recklessly tolerated
the conduct (the MPC test). In the context of criminal law,
however, such sensitivity is a strength, not a weakness. Justice
requires the criminal justice system to treat like parties
alike.396 Tests based on crude versions of vicarious liability do
not allow for this symmetry. Under the traditional respondeat
superior standard of liability, and to a lesser extent, under the
MPC standard, it is irrelevant whether a corporation made vigi-
lant efforts to encourage its employees to comply with the
spirit as well as the letter of the law, or whether a corporation
boldly encouraged its employees to flout the law at every turn.
By comparison, the corporate ethos standard of liability strives
to distinguish between such corporations, and subjects only the
latter to criminal liability.
Another likely criticism and a true weakness in the corpo-
rate ethos standard is that by enhancing the efficacy of a partic-
ular defense strategy, the corporate ethos standard may
395. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
396. See supra note 14.
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encourage executives to falsely incriminate the corporate de-
fendant. Courts can remedy this weakness only by diligent en-
forcement of sixth amendment rights.397
Another valid criticism of the corporate ethos standard is
that it addresses only one of the jurisprudential problems con-
cerning corporate criminal liability - intent. The corporate
ethos test does not address the issue of what type of conduct
the criminal law should focus upon. Murder for hire, kidnap-
ping, rape, and arson for profit are all evil and immoral acts,
and most people would agree that public resources and the
stigma of the criminal law should be brought to bear on those
who commit such acts. Similarly, most people would vehe-
mently oppose legislation that makes criminal the driving of a
dirty automobile (however intentionally) or the failure to mow
one's grass on a certain schedule (again, however intentionally).
We would agree that these trivial matters are unworthy of the
resources or power of the criminal law. When the criminal law
is turned toward corporate actors, however, the type of conduct
appropriate for its attention presents a particularly poignant
problem. More so than with individual criminal conduct, the
public does not always perceive the conduct for which a corpo-
ration is potentially criminally liable as morally bad or evil.
Often, the conduct only jeopardizes a particular economic
model. Antitrust laws are an example: If corporations willfully
engage in certain monopolistic behavior in a market economy,
they have committed a crime.39 8 By contrast, if business per-
sons in communist economies dare to compete with the govern-
ment approved monopolies, they have committed a crime. If
conduct is truly evil, then surely our perception of it as evil and
criminal will not blow with the winds of economic change.
The morally neutral content of many of the criminal stat-
utes that apply to corporations raises a separate jurisprudential
problem: How much and how often can the government prose-
cute corporations for morally neutral behavior (however inten-
tional the behavior), before use of the criminal law becomes
inappropriate? An obvious question follows: If the criminal
justice system should attempt to reserve the criminal law for
morally evil conduct, how are we to decide whether conduct is
morally evil?
This Article does not address this morality of conduct con-
397. See supra notes 333-51 and accompanying text.
398. See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988)).
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troversy beyond noting that when we say the criminal law is to
punish only morally culpable behavior we mean two things:
that only certain types of conduct should be punished, and then
only when such conduct is committed intentionally. These two
components are inextricably intertwined. Any progress that
this Article makes toward resolving the intent issue is limited
until we also resolve the issue of what type of corporate con-
duct is appropriately subjected to criminal liability.
CONCLUSION
American jurisprudence currently utilizes two general
standards for imposing criminal liability on corporations: tradi-
tional respondeat superior and the Model Penal Code. The
traditional respondeat superior standard holds a corporation li-
able if any corporate agent committed a criminal offense while
acting within the scope of his employment and for the purpose
of benefitting the corporation.3 99 The MPC standard provides
that a corporation is liable if a high managerial agent per-
formed or recklessly authorized the criminal conduct.400 Both
of these standards employ vicarious liability by imputing the in-
tent of an individual corporate agent to the corporation. This
Article suggests that proof of intent is too essential to the na-
ture, and power, of the criminal law to employ crude standards
of vicarious liability that poorly focus on intent. Just as the no-
tion of intent has evolved in the past, it must continue to evolve
if the criminal law is to be used to convict fictional entities.
This Article proposes a new paradigm of corporate intent
that builds upon the traditional respondeat superior and MPC
standards as well as on criticisms of these approaches. Like
both of the current standards, the corporate ethos standard of
liability looks to the acts and intent of individuals within the
corporation. Like Fisse's notion of reactive corporate fault,40 1
the corporate ethos standard looks to the remedial efforts (or
lack thereof) that a corporation takes after a first violation.
Like the due diligence affirmative defense, the corporate ethos
standard considers the corporation's diligence in preventing
criminal conduct by its agents. Although all of these factors
are relevant under the corporate ethos standard, none is suffi-
cient to determine a corporation's criminal liability. Rather,
the factfinder will examine each of these facts, along with a
399. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
401. See Fisse, supra note 3, at 1190.
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corporation's formal and informal corporate hierarchy, its goals
and policies, its compensation scheme, and the education and
monitoring it provides for corporate employees. If this exami-
nation shows that a corporation whose employees violated the
law perpetuated an ethos that encouraged this violation, the
corporation is criminally liable for the acts of its agents. If no
such ethos exists, the corporation is not criminally liable even
though its agents violated the law.
By providing a theoretical and practical framework for
identifying and proving corporate intent, the corporate ethos
standard of liability offers advantages over our current stan-
dards for holding corporations criminally liable. It enhances
our ability to distinguish among diverse corporations, and en-
courages corporations to implement meaningful internal con-
trols that reduce the potential for corporate crime. Further, it
compensates for deficiencies in controlling corporate misbehav-
ior through imposing criminal liability on individuals within
corporations. Finally, it is practical, workable, and provable
from information already available through criminal discovery
and trials.
The criminal justice system is a potent vehicle for protect-
ing society and putting lives back on course, but like an old car
used to carry too much too far, it will burn out if we force it to
do that which it cannot. Accordingly, courts should use the
criminal law only for those problems that can benefit from its
unique power.40 2 Becaise this power comes from applying the
criminal law only to intentional acts, we must respect this limi-
tation in our pursuit of corporate criminal defendants. Histori-
cally, however, we have not sought, or proven, corporate intent.
402. Rosenberg, The Kingdom of Cocaine, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 7, 1989, at
26, 26-34. Rosenberg argues that the criminal law cannot solve all of society's
problems in the context of stopping the flood of cocaine from Columbia. Id. at
33-34. She argues that socioeconomic and cultural problems are causing this
illegal exportation of cocaine, not law enforcement problems. Id. at 30-33. She
explains that illegal drug traffic has taken over every segment of Columbian
society. As a result, "[flaw enforcement doesn't work... because as presently
implemented it is in the interests of practically nobody in Columbia." Id. at
27. Rosenberg suggests that if we want to curb this illegal exportation of co-
caine, we should negotiate more favorable trade agreements for Columbia's le-
gitimate exports, rather than using law enforcement strategies of arresting
traffickers, crop eradication, and dismantling of labs. Id at 26, 33-34.
The analogy in Rosenberg's article to corporate crime is not complete.
Corporate crime still demands a response from law enforcement; the export of
cocaine from Columbia may not. But, to the extent our approaches to both
problems have been rigidly fixed in our current ways of proceeding with little
creativity for more appropriate responses, the analogy is apt.
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As a result, we have done a poor job of policing corporate mis-
deeds and have squandered the power of the criminal law. The
standard of liability proposed in this Article is a conceptual and
practical suggestion for remedying this deficiency.
